

# LEAVING THE SHADOWS?

Pakistani Christians  
and the Search for Orientation  
in an Overwhelmingly Muslim Society

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## CONTENTS

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| INTRODUCTION   | 5         |
| <b>I</b>   |           |
| <b>Islam and Politics In Pakistan.</b>   |           |
| <b>On the general conditions of non-Muslim minorities</b>                              | <b>7</b>  |
| <b>ONE</b>   |           |
| The Trauma of History and the Present  | 8         |
| <b>TWO</b>   |           |
| Two Faces of Islam   | 11        |
| <b>THREE</b>   |           |
| The Long Road to Islamisation  | 13        |
| <b>FOUR</b>  |           |
| Transition to Democracy: Circle or spiral?   | 16        |
| <b>FIVE</b>  |           |
| Armed Democracy?   | 19        |
| <b>II</b>  |           |
| <b>Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics.</b>                       |           |
| <b>An empirical survey</b>   | <b>22</b> |
| <b>ONE</b>   |           |
| Strata and Cleavages:<br>Pakistani society as reflected in a sample                    | 23        |
| <b>TWO</b>   |           |
| Fear of the Future, Trust, Caution, Powerlessness:<br>Psycho-social sensitivities      | 31        |
| <b>THREE</b>   |           |
| A Lower-Class Society in Search of Equality:<br>Perceptions of the economy and society | 35        |
| <b>FOUR</b>  |           |
| A Religious Society: Religion, ethnicity and identity                                  | 42        |

|  |  |    |
|--|--|----|
| <b>FIVE</b>  |  |    |
| State and Theocracy:   |  |    |
| Opinions on the relationship between religion and politics                               |  | 48 |
| <b>SIX</b>   |  |    |
| Tolerance out of Insight and Conviction:   |  |    |
| Perceptions of differences and coexistence   |  | 52 |
| <b>SEVEN</b>   |  |    |
| Democrats and Others:  |  |    |
| Attitudes to the political order   |  | 56 |
| <b>EIGHT</b>   |  |    |
| Three Political Subcultures:   |  |    |
| Differences in political perceptions, aspirations and orientations                       |  | 64 |
| <br>   |  |    |
| <b>III</b>   |  |    |
| <b>Thoughts about the Scope for Action and Possible Options for Pakistani Christians</b> |  | 73 |
| <br>   |  |    |
| <b>ONE</b>   |  |    |
| A Church of Untouchables   |  | 74 |
| <b>TWO</b>   |  |    |
| Education and Settlements: Ways out of inferiority                                       |  | 77 |
| <b>THREE</b>   |  |    |
| From Outcasts to Scapegoats?   |  |    |
| On Muslim misperceptions of Pakistani Christians   |  | 79 |
| <b>FOUR</b>  |  |    |
| Looking for Allies   |  | 81 |
| <b>FIVE</b>  |  |    |
| Looking for New Ways out of the Shadows:   |  |    |
| Preliminary thoughts for a discussion  |  | 82 |
| <br>   |  |    |
| EPILOGUE   |  | 85 |
| <br>   |  |    |
| Selected Recent Literature   |  | 91 |

## INTRODUCTION

Pakistan's Christians are a minority in the shadow of an overwhelming majority. In absolute numbers, two and a half million church members is a good-sized community, more than the number of Christians in Lebanon. But in a country with an estimated total population of 159 million it is tiny.

The Christians are also kept in the shadows by the social contempt of the majority. Most modern-day Christians are descended from "untouchables", literally outcasts, a class of people that existed below and outside the Hindu caste system. Gandhi called them Harijans. Today they are popularly known as Daliths. Their conversion to Christianity was motivated not least by a desire to escape from this social stigma. Despite both creeds teaching of equality, almost two thousand years of Christianity in South India and a thousand years of Islam in North India - including present-day Pakistan - have not been able to overcome the Brahmanic caste divisions and caste prejudice of Hinduism. Even today no Muslim will do "sanitary work", in particular cleaning toilets and similar activities. This attitude offers untouchables an economic niche, be they Christian or Hindu, as will be shown below. However, this modest economic livelihood is achieved at the cost of permanent social inferiority. Most sanitary workers in the cities and towns of Pakistan are Christians. They are only one - not negligible - part of Christian society, which also includes farmers, agricultural labourers, skilled manual workers, white-collar workers, teachers and businessmen, even government employees and military officers. Not all Christians are sanitary workers, but most sanitary workers are Christians. Yet, Muslims tend to view all Christians - the whole defined by a part - with social disdain. This prejudice is a considerable barrier to social advancement and social recognition.

Finally, Pakistan's Christians stand in the shadow of an Islamist threat. For a good century they were spared the ravages of persecution, faced neither pogroms nor were involved in armed conflict. They were an irrelevant minority, irrelevant for the British colonial rulers and irrelevant for the elites of the independent Pakistan that succeeded the former in 1947. And they remained irrelevant till recent decades, when their position began to grow steadily more difficult. This occurred as a by-product of inner-Muslim clashes, rather than purposely directed against the Christians. In the 1970s, along with many other privately run primary schools in the country, Christian schools were nationalized. At the same time, admission policies at state schools continued to discriminate against Christian children. Nationalization has been partially rolled back since the 1980s. However, in that decade, Islamisation of the state made great strides: the constitution and all laws had to comply with the shari'a and the sunna; a shari'a bench of the Supreme Court was created with the competence to examine this compliance; and, finally, a blasphemy law that is unique in the Islamic world constitutes - not least owing to imprecise wording and questionable procedures of presenting evidence - a constant threat not only to ostensible and real Muslim dissidents, but also, and increasingly, to members of the Christian and other minorities.

In addition to the threat of an Islamising state, since the beginning of the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 there has been a threat from Islamist organisations. They identify local Christians with the hated West and hold them responsible for its policies. This may seem grotesque, but it has led to the destruction of Christian settlements and churches, attacks on individuals and murder. When the US invaded Iraq in March 2003, Christians feared the worst, especially as an Islamist leader had announced that ten Pakistani Christians would be killed for every Muslim killed. In Bishop Anthony Lobo's opinion, the pope's clear statement on Iraq prevented such acts. Despite this, the Islamist threat is as acute as ever. There is a clear paradox which has highly devastating effects on the Christians of Pakistan: On the one hand, they are untouchable, unclean and irrelevant, and on the other, they are quickly associated with the actions and power of the West, and they have to bear the brunt of all problems generated in the West vis-à-vis the Islamic world. Since the parliamentary elections of 2002, when previously splintered Islamist parties campaigned as a single group for the first time, the Islamists are the third strongest political force in parliament. In the North-West Frontier Province they won a majority and in Baluchistan they are part of a coalition government. Under these conditions it is difficult to imagine the Islamisation of the constitution being rescinded or even the blasphemy law being amended.

The shadows have grown darker. Whether the Islamist menace grows worse will probably depend, first, on the result of the confrontation between the Pakistani state and the armed Islamists threatening the current government and, second, on developments in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Christians have no influence on either.

Whether they can escape from the shadows of social inferiority depends, primarily, on intellectual, social and political developments in Pakistani society as a whole. How satisfied is this society, how does it express its religiosity, how tolerant is it and, when all is said and done, how democratic may it become? Which social and political forces are most likely to give a minority breathing space - not necessarily for the sake of, or as a favour to, these minorities, but because they want some breathing space for themselves? This study will focus primarily on empirical investigations of these questions.

Pakistan's Christians can also play their part in removing the stigma of social inferiority through self-help, education and occupational advancement. The steps they have already taken will be briefly outlined. Finally, the way out of inferiority can be eased by support from the church in the rest of the world.

## Islam and Politics in Pakistan

### On the general conditions of non-Muslim minorities

*"You are free; you are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. ... We are starting this business with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state. ... You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state."*

*Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Presidential Address to the Constituent Assembly, 11 August 1947*

It would take the Constituent Assembly nine years to conclude its deliberations. Shortly after making his appeal for a politically secular Pakistan, Jinnah revised it under pressure of fundamentalist demonstrators. In January 1948 he promised that legislation would comply with the shari'a.

The authority of the Father of Pakistan - a Shi'a (an Ismaili Bohra, to be exact) and religious moderate by personal inclination - was not strong enough to realise the state he dreamed of, a state for the Muslim minority of India, not an Islamic state.

Religious minorities played a role in these initial debates in the Constituent Assembly only with regard to the question of whether the interpretation of God's word was reserved to Muslim clerics or whether deputies elected by the people could also pronounce on this matter. In response to reformist Muslims, the Fundamentalist supporters of the former view objected that an assembly in which non-Muslims were also represented could not make laws that would bind Muslims. In fact, the minorities meant little to either side; rather they served only as a cudgel for both sides in their confrontation over who had the power to interpret Islam.

From the start, secular or reformist Muslims were on the defensive against those who claimed to represent the true teachings. For fear of losing political support, neither the secular nor the reformist Muslims wanted to appear as less faithful than others. In this way the fundamentalists acquired an influence that far exceeded their numerical strength; often enough they held the balance of power between competing political views.

Why did all political groups compete for Islamic legitimation? One important reason is the historic trauma of the Pakistani Muslims.

## ONE

### The Trauma of History and the Present

The history of Islam in the territory of modern-day Pakistan goes back to the eighth century and the Umayyad caliphate. From the 13th century onward it took the form of hegemony: Muslims ruled large parts of India almost continuously from 1206 A.D., the date of the founding of the Sultanate of Delhi, to 1858, when the last Mogul emperor abdicated under pressure from British colonial rulers.

The end of this empire signalled not only the beginning of a century of European domination but also, for the Muslims in particular, a change from being a ruling minority to being a minority ruled by foreigners - a very large minority, but a minority nonetheless. When the independence movement was launched with the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885, Muslims had reservations about joining, because they saw it as representing a largely Hindu and upper class interest. In 1906, the Muslim League was founded to represent the specific interests of this large minority. Three decades later Jinnah drew up his "Two Nations Theory" because he believed that Muslims would not be able to preserve their way of life under Hindu rule. They needed to carve their own state out of the predominantly Muslim parts of the country.

In 1947, Jinnah achieved his goal. On independence British India was partitioned between India and Pakistan. The costs were enormous: Between 1947-48 expulsion, flight and religious cleansing caused the deaths of over 800,000 people and the resettlement of 24 million in both directions. The Muslim state was made up of two provinces 1,600 kilometres apart: West Pakistan comprising the western part of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and East Pakistan comprising the eastern part of Bengal. Kashmir, a principality with a predominantly Muslim population and a Hindu maharajah, was, and remains, a disputed territory. The first war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir broke out in the year of independence and ended two years later with the division of the territory along the ceasefire line or Line of Control (LOC), which neither of the states recognizes as their respective state frontier. Neither a second war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965, nor the Kargil conflict of 1999, or the ongoing guerrilla warfare of recent years has altered this situation.

In 1971 East Pakistan launched a war of secession. Although the majority of the population lived in the east, the west insisted on political parity. Five provinces were created - four in the west - each with equal seats in the Upper House of Parliament. The Lower House was to represent each province's share of the population. While in the Upper House West Pakistan would outnumber East Pakistan by four to one, the latter would have a small majority in the Lower House. But both houses were to have equal power. What was presented as parity, amounted to clear West Pakistani domination. To add insult to injury, despite the fact that Bengali was spoken by a majority of the population, Urdu was made the national language. Enforced with increasing harshness these policies provoked



open resistance - which received military support from India. Pakistan responded by invading India. However, it suffered a crushing defeat, losing half its navy, a third of its army and a quarter of its air force.

East Pakistan declared independence as Bangladesh and quickly received international recognition. As a consequence, Pakistan, now just the former western province, lost its position as the largest Muslim nation in the world and with it any chance of establishing a balance of power with India. Many Pakistanis feel uncomfortable with the fact that India never defined itself as a state for Hindus but as a secular territorial state, a vision which even the decade-long attempts by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was unable to undermine. Pakistanis tend to point out that Indians have always Akhund Bharat (Greater India) or Mahabharta (Mother India) as their goal and many accuse India of wanting to reverse the partition of the subcontinent on the grounds that India does not accept Islam as Pakistan's *raison d'état*.

Fear of India explains the role of the army in Pakistan. The country spends more on defence than any other state except Israel - money that cannot be used for development. When India exploded an atomic bomb and unveiled medium-range missiles in 1998, Pakistan had to quickly follow suit with the so-called Islamic bomb (a term left over from the early seventies). There is now a very real danger that the Kashmir conflict could degenerate into a nuclear war. This has led to a cautious rapprochement between the two states recently, though Pakistan's fear of its eastern neighbour is still very present.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 added a threat from the north-west to that from the east. Pakistan was forced to accept millions of Afghan refugees, for the most part co-tribalists of the Pakhtuns in the NWFP. The one justification Pakistan offered for its support of the Afghan insurgency against Soviet occupation was the need to defend Islam against attack by infidels. After the Soviets were forced to withdraw in 1988/89, Pakistan generated and then supported the Taliban in the civil war that followed. The Taliban are fundamentalists who received their ideological and military training in the madrasas (Islamic catechetical schools) along the Pakistani border. Whereas the Pakistani establishment and particularly the army regarded the Taliban regime as a gain in "strategic depth", the Pakistani fundamentalists viewed it as a model for their own country.

This debate has resurfaced after the American invasion in Afghanistan and the success of the Islamic political parties in the NWFP. The invasion of Afghanistan by the US and its NATO allies and the demise of the Taliban regime changed the threat scenario to the north and its ideological connotations. It was difficult for the army to break with its "strategic depth" and the alliance with the Taliban after having created and trained them. Massive military aid received from the United States because of Pakistan's new alignment with the war against terrorism may have eased the transition. For Pakistan's fundamentalists, on the other hand, this involvement in the struggle against Islamist terror is a betrayal of Islam. This participation is also extremely unpopular among the population at large. The question of what true Islam is or ought to be has seldom been debated with such stridency. It has become more difficult than ever for non-fundamentalist Muslims in Pakistan to demonstrate their Islamic credentials.

As the country has moved into the present, the traumatic threats have increased. Pakistanis feel that the current rapprochement with India has reduced the level of threat from the east, but not removed it by any means. The view of the threat from the north-west depends on the eye of the beholder: fundamentalists see it in much the same light as Bin Laden does: a threat posed by crusaders and imperialists; many other Pakistanis see it as a stone-age version of Islam threatening modern conceptions of Islam. The conflict in Afghanistan has led to a far sharper edge in the confrontation over the nature of the state than even during the time of the Constituent Assembly.

## Two

### Two Faces of Islam

Pakistan's Islam has many faces: far from being monolithic, it has a variety of confessions and many different interpretations of the relationship between religion, society and state.

The Sunnis form the largest single group in the country. It is estimated that between 15% and 25% of Pakistani Muslims are Shi'as, the majority of whom are Twelver Shi'as and a small number Ismailis. The latter moved to Karachi from Bombay after partition in 1947. Among their members are many of the country's leading merchant and industrial dynasties. A very small religious community operating on the edge of Islam is the Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadis' membership of Islam has always been disputed because the founder declared himself to be the Mahdi and claimed a continuing revelation post Islam.

Despite their dominant numerical importance, it would be misleading to see the Sunnis as a homogenous majority, because there are many different traditions followed amongst the Sunnis. A small but influential group is the Deobandi, named after an important school of Islamic studies founded at Deoband near Delhi in 1866. This school teaches a strict, traditionalist Islam. Its many schools focus on teaching the Qur'an and the Sunna; they reject modern science. They created the Jamiyyat-ul Ulama-i Islam (JUI) as their political arm. Initially JUI worked with the Indian National Congress, opposing the Muslim League's demand for a separate state. In their view a nation-state, even a Muslim one, has no right to exist; the goal should be the creation of one worldwide state for all Muslims. However, once Pakistan was created, a large number of the Deobandi did not hesitate to migrate to the new state and to actively seek political influence. Ever since, its programme has focused on the full Islamisation of Pakistan, i.e. making the Shari'a the supreme law of the country. JUI enjoys considerable support in Pakhtun and Baluchi areas as well as among the Mohajir (refugees from India) in Sind. Its madrasas have been the training schools for the Taliban of Afghanistan.

Another important confessional community in Sunni Islam is the Barailvi. Their respect for holy men and participation in shrine cults and numerous festivals reflect the Sufi tradition, which is seen by JUI as flirting with idolatry. The Barailvi had no difficulty accepting the state of Pakistan, and also founded a party, the Jamiyyat-ul Ulama-i Pakistan (JUP).

However, the best organised and most powerful of the smaller Sunni groups is the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). It was founded in 1941 by Abul Ala Maududi, one of the most influential thinkers of modern fundamentalism with an influence that stretched far beyond Pakistan's borders. Maududi's central demand is a return to pure Islamic teachings and the rejection of mysticism and all popular cultic expressions in Islam. Shari'a is to dominate and to regulate all aspects of society, and the state must be subordinated to this Islamic law. It is the duty of the Islamic state to ensure

that the law of Islam prevails. It was Maududi's declared goal to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state and it is still the goal of the JI. The way to achieve this was by training a devoutly religious and politically effective elite. Initially Maududi also opposed the creation of Pakistan, but then accepted the fait accompli, moved to Lahore with his supporters and staked his claim in the new state. Today the JI has strongholds in the Punjab, Karachi and the NWFP. It, too, runs numerous madrasas, in particular in the area along the Afghan border. Its student organisation has a reputation for militancy.

Although these minority groups of Sunnis in Pakistan have very different roots and teachings, they generally agree on the most important demands. They are very well organised and therefore have a far stronger presence and influence than their numbers would suggest.

The majority of Sunnis do not belong to such Islamist groups and hold a variety of other views. There are even explicit secularists, particularly among the older generation of high-ranking government officials, military officers, judges and lawyers. By far the largest group of Sunnis probably belongs to the broad spectrum of what is generally called Islamic modernists. They are proud to be Muslims, even pious Muslims, but believe religion is a private matter. The state should be run in accordance with the rules of liberal or even social democracy. The roots of the modernist stream go back to the 19th century. Until the partition of India, their most important institution was the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College (from 1875-1920, today: Aligarh Muslim University) in Uttar Pradesh, the alma mater of several generations of western educated Muslim intellectuals. Among many influential thinkers of the modernist school, one of the most recognized is Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938). Iqbal taught that in addition to the Qur'an and the Sunna there was a third source of interpreting faith: ijma, a consensus of scholars. For modernists, however, ijma should not be left only to the ulema. Rather, it is incumbent on the elected deputies to establish consensus and pass modern Islamic laws.

Modernist thinking predominated in the Indian Muslim League in the years preceding partition. It was also dominant in the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and its numerous splinter parties as well as in the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which was founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto at the end of 1967 as a progressive alternative to the PML. PML and PPP are often called secular parties, but that is not quite accurate. Although both are doubtlessly far more secular than, say, the JI, they owe more to Islamic modernism than to unadulterated secularism. Modernist nuances are also unmistakable in the political vocabulary of the current president.

The main problem confronting the modernists was and is the fact that although broad sections of the population regard their ideas as sensible and share them, they are seldom formulated clearly. The fundamentalists, in contrast, use the precise form of Islamic legal terminology and are masters in simplifying issues.

In the clash over how Islamic the state of Pakistan should be, many modernists still believe that they can get away with general declarations, and even with just lip service. The history of the progressive Islamisation of Pakistan's constitutional, civil and criminal codes documents their mistake.

## THREE

### The Long Road to Islamisation

Pakistan took no fewer than nine years, until 1956, to promulgate its first constitution. Differences of opinion about relations between state and religion were not the only cause of this delay - relations between East and West Pakistan being another disputed subject - but they were particularly controversial. After Jinnah's early death in 1948, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and the Muslim League attempted to push through an essentially modernist constitution.

In March 1949 a majority of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly passed an "Objectives Resolution" that Pakistan should be an Islamic state, though with the main features of a western democracy. In response, Maulana Maududi produced a coherent fundamentalist concept: the head of state should be elected not by parliament but by the ulema; a council of the ulema should draw up and interpret Islamic laws and administer justice. His draft constitution was not accepted, but nor was that of the reformists.

In 1953 the prime minister of the Punjab, with the support of sections of the JI, launched a campaign against the Ahmadis, with the object of having them constitutionally declared non-Muslims. This campaign provoked ugly riots in Lahore, until the central government under Muhammad Ali Bogra intervened. Maududi was arrested and sentenced to death, but later reprieved. Bogra oversaw the drafting of a strictly secularist constitution, which in turn drew the opposition not only of the ulema but also of most modernists. The last stand of the secularists was the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in 1954.

A new convention took two years to present a new draft. This was not a compromise between secularists and other factions, but between the reformists and the ulema. It proposed incorporating the Objectives Resolution as preamble, declaring Pakistan to be an "Islamic Republic", whose president had to be a Muslim. A consultative commission for "Islamic ideology" would have the function of ensuring that laws passed by parliament complied with the Qur'an, the hadith, and the Sunna; the government would appoint the members of the commission. The reformists found the compromise acceptable because the text did not mention the shari'a and the ideology commission would have only a right of consultation. The constitution entered into force in 1956.

On taking power in 1958, General Mohammad Ayub Khan attempted to reverse the march of Islamisation. His family law of 1961 improved the rights of women: polygamy was allowed only if the first wife consented, and a man could no longer divorce simply by repudiating his wife. But a year later his move to delete the adjective "Islamic" from the name of the republic generated such strong protest that he restored it in 1963, and it has not been tampered with since. His successor was yet another general, viz. General Muhammad Yahya Khan, who conducted the first real elections in Pakistan in 1970. He was in charge when the country was divided

into Bangladesh and Pakistan, one of the direct results of those elections. In the aftermath of this war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was appointed initially as the first civilian martial law administrator on the basis of his electoral victories during the 1970 elections in the then West Pakistan. Later he became the Prime Minister on the same basis.

In 1973, his government promulgated Pakistan's second constitution. It did not incorporate any substantial changes in respect of religion and state nor of the status of non-Muslims. However, during Bhutto's period in office a number of laws were passed that would have fateful consequences: Prohibition of alcohol (while at the same time Bhutto confessed in a public forum to the daily consumption of alcohol himself), substitution of Friday for Sunday as the weekly day of rest, and the nationalisation of schools. The latter had a direct impact on the Christian community in particular. While all these laws aimed at placating the Islamists, the worst compromise that Bhutto made was the constitutional amendment of 1974, which classified Ahmadis as non-Muslims.

Ahmadis retained the right to practice their religion, but they were forbidden to proselytise, and they were excluded from high offices of state. Thus, for the first time, a group of non-Muslims were defined by law as not equal to Muslims. Even worse, accused of rigging the elections of 1977 in order to obtain a two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendments, Bhutto tried to compromise by negotiating on the role of the shari'a as the supreme law of the country - precisely what the reformists had prevented from being incorporated into the country's first constitution.

Bhutto's opportunistic actions prepared the way along which General Zia ul-Haq, who in 1977 overthrew Bhutto in a coup, would proceed out of conviction - his views were almost the same as those of the JI. Islamic criminal law was codified by presidential decree: stoning or corporal punishment for adultery, amputation of a hand for theft, jail or the death sentence for blasphemy. The rules of evidence were changed: the testimony of a Muslim woman would count only half that of a Muslim man. Thus, half of the population would no longer enjoy equality before the law, and the minorities were given even less importance than Muslim women. A constitutional amendment excluded minorities (including Ahmadis) from the general adult franchise. Instead they were to vote in separate elections, not on the basis of constituencies but on national lists. For long years the minorities and human right activists fought this amendment which, however, was only removed as late as 2004.

Equality was also violated by the introduction of a special tax on Muslims to pay for educational institutions; up to this point zakat (alms given to the needy in society) was distributed privately. Another step that had far more momentous consequences was the creation of shari'a benches for the provincial courts and the Supreme Court. The highest bench had the right to check that all laws, existing and future, complied with Islamic law.

Ironically, one of the first laws that the bench objected to was the Blasphemy Act of 1986, on the grounds that blasphemy could not be punished by prison but only by death. In 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his PML government bowed to a ruling of the shari'a judges and introduced the death sentence. The law opens the door wide to arbitrary charges. Most victims of this law have been Christians and Ahmadis, but they have also included Hindus, animists and non-conformist Mus-

lims. Also in 1991, the Shari'a act, which was a perpetual demand of the Islamists and which had been partly implemented during General Zia ul-Haq's rule was finally approved by an act of Parliament, thus giving it a legitimacy which will be hard to undo.

The current president, General Pervez Musharaf, has let it be known that he is prepared to amend the Blasphemy Act, but has met with persistent resistance from the Islamist parties who under his rule have gained more seats in both federal and provincial assemblies than ever before in the history of Pakistan. Musharaf so far has backed down from his publicly announced commitments. However, it must be acknowledged that he has had one measure that discriminates against religious minorities repealed: separate electoral lists for different confessions. The minorities elected their own representatives, but could not exercise any influence on the large parties. Under the electoral law introduced by Musharaf, there are no separate electoral lists for members of minority groups. Musharaf revived Bhutto's 1973 constitutional rules on this issue: Minorities were allowed again a general franchise along with the rest of the population, obtaining proportional representation in the national assembly and specified seats in the provincial assemblies. In addition, in each assembly there are reserved seats for minorities, which are filled in accordance with the percentage of votes received by each party with representatives from minority lists drawn up by each party - a privilege, not discrimination. However, it is not yet clear whether the general franchise is applicable to the municipal level too.

To summarise: the question of Islamisation was raised right at the inception of Pakistan, proceeded intermittently and took a long time to reach the present state. It is still not fully resolved. The process was curbed and partially revised by certain military rulers while also implemented and enforced by others. As for the democratically elected governments of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif when it came to religion and state, they behaved as populists, hiding their personal reformist views in the hope of gaining votes in the Islamist camp.

This raises the question of the peculiarities of democracy in Pakistan.

## FOUR

### Transition to Democracy: Circle or spiral?

In less than six decades the army has taken power four times in independent Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. Five times the country has had democratically elected governments<sup>2</sup>. The nature of the current "elected" government since 2002 is disputed. Some see it as democratic with the military sharing some of its power, others as a "controlled democracy" under Army patronage, and some see it as not democratic at all but an army rule with a civilian veneer. Elections are scheduled for 2007 but the future of democracy remains uncertain.

Pakistan's history of unstable democracy contrasts sharply with that of India, the other successor state of the British Raj. India has experienced just one - civilian, not military - intermezzo of authoritarian rule. In Pakistan, however, the obstacles to democratic stability were always far greater than in India. From its birth the country was separated into East and West Pakistan with a hostile India in between. On account of its larger population, the eastern province always had more seats in parliament. West Pakistan never willingly accepted this, and eventually preferred partition rather than minority status. Prior to this, the political leaders of West Pakistan had tried to organise their part of the country as a single political entity, despite the extraordinarily diverse ethnic groups and history of the province, so as to create the prerequisite for parity with East Pakistan. These attempts at homogenisation provoked resistance, and ethno-separatist movements emerged among the Pakhtuns and Baluchis and, to a lesser extent, among the Sindhi also. Even after the secession of Bangladesh these strong identities persisted, contributing to the splintering of the party system.

But there were also other reasons for this splintering. Large landowners played an important political role, albeit to varying degrees, in all provinces. The first-past-the-post electoral system made it easy for them to turn their social and economic clout to political advantage. They constituted a majority in most of Pakistan's elected assemblies. Secure in the knowledge of a loyal though often coerced electoral base, they were and are not dependent on party support. They join and leave parties at will. Thus, presidents and prime ministers have a continuous struggle to prevent their parliamentary majorities from fraying. Hence, they have to offer the deputies incentives for their continued support, whether political posts or preferential treatment of their supporters in the civil service or the granting of state contracts - there is no clear dividing line between political patronage and corruption. Every military intervention followed a period of vehement - and usually justified - complaint about corrupt politicians. Thus it is not surprising that every military government has initially been welcomed with relief by the general populace.

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<sup>1</sup> Viz., by Generals Ayub Khan (1958-68), Yahya Khan (1968-71), Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) and Pervez Musharaf (1999 to the present).

<sup>2</sup> Viz., Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77), Benazir Bhutto (1988-90), Nawaz Sharif (1990-93), Benazir Bhutto (1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1997-99).



Coalitions of distinguished personalities are chronically unstable - hence the persistent undoing of the Muslim League (ML), Pakistan's great party of independence. It split a number of times, producing a series of PML-hyphen-leader's name splinter parties. Over time, overall support for the various hyphen-leagues has remained more or less constant. It is particularly strong in rural areas, but to the extent that PML governments have pursued liberal economic policies, they have also enjoyed the support of commerce and industry.

The Muslim League also gave birth to another party that differed in orientation and somewhat in structure: the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a highly gifted populist leader, it won broad support among urban office workers and the working classes. In the 1970s the party called itself socialist. Bhutto's government nationalised numerous manufacturing and trading companies, banks and insurance companies, which generated enthusiastic support among the common people, who wanted greater social equality. Admittedly, the PPP was not nearly as socialist about restructuring land tenure, but actually enhanced the feudal hold. Bhutto himself was a large landowner, as were many of his supporters in rural Sindh and Punjab. Thus, his land reforms were half-hearted. The PPP also made widespread use of patronage, albeit less exclusively than the different varieties of PML. Hence, it is not surprising that PPP governments were also accused of corruption in the 1970s and 1990s. As a result of the instability of elected governments, important areas of public policy were neglected. Pakistan's health and educational systems are undeveloped. Its school enrolment and literacy figures are closer to those of sub-Saharan Africa than other countries in Asia. In short: every democratic government did far less than it promised.

The consequence was not only widespread disappointment among the populace, but also general contempt for civilian politicians among high-ranking government officials and the military. As general dissatisfaction spread, the latter were increasingly tempted to show that they could do better. Naturally, the military also had its own interests to defend. The permanent threat to the country and India's military superiority were enough to justify huge military expenditures, which regularly accounted for more than half of the government's budget. Such expenditures also financed the living standards of soldiers, in particular of officers, and huge investments in the private sector through various army foundations. The cantonment areas were a complete contrast to the cities on whose edge they stood: green oases with their own water and electricity supplies and their own hospitals and schools. The officers' corps not only lives well, it is also well educated. Hence it is not surprising that they continue to believe that military government is better for the country.

But once in power, the military soon learned that the economy and society did not easily submit to simple commands. After a short time, retired officers in government offices started acting like civilian politicians and government employees. It did not take long before military governments had credibility problems. They responded with experiments in "guided democracy" - first with the appointment and then the election of advisory bodies, from which, however, political parties were always excluded. Pakistan's second military regime ended with defeat in war, resulting in the loss of half the country, and the third after its leader was killed in a plane crash. On both occasions the army was relieved to return to barracks.

The results of free elections after the third military government showed little change from the political patterns that emerged after the first and second military governments: the PLM and the PPP were back, as were the Islamist parties and the small ethno-particularist groupings. The fourth military intervention in Pakistani politics has not yet run its course. However, one may hope it may produce a different result from the first three.

## FIVE

### Armed Democracy?

General Pervez Musharaf took power when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to remove him as commander-in-chief. The military command came out in support of its chief, and it was Sharif who was removed from office and arrested. Musharaf did not hesitate to name himself chief executive. The Supreme Court supported this action as a "state of necessity" - a legal doctrine that had already been applied to legitimise the position of previous military rulers. Like his predecessors Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haq, Musharaf immediately took highly popular measures to fight corruption and enhance economic development.

He also acted more quickly than they to obtain not only legal but also democratic legitimisation of his rule. A referendum on April 2002 confirmed him as president for five years. It is undisputed that Musharaf is popular, but a stated 97.6% vote in his favour casts a shadow on the validity of the result. Unimpressed by accusations of electoral rigging, the president set about reconfiguring the state's power structures. In August 2002 he issued a Legal Framework Order. The core of this order was the creation of an institution borrowed from Turkey, a National Security Council (NSC) made up of military officers. The NSC had the right to supervise the actions of the civil organs of state. Henceforth the president has the right in conjunction with the NSC to dismiss the government and to dissolve parliament. If this arrangement survives, the army will never need to stage a coup again, as it already plays a crucial role in all significant decisions. Musharaf justified this with military precision: "If you want to keep the army out, bring them in." Aqil Khan, a political scientist, calls this system "armoured democracy".

Musharaf held parliamentary elections after a shorter period in power than his military predecessors. At the same time, he did all he could to ensure a result in keeping with his wishes. A party close to the president was organised under the name PML-Q; the Q stands for Quaid-e-Azam, Jinnah's honorary title. Thereby, combining both the founding party and the founding father, Musharaf declared his political colour. He made it known that his intention was, if not reversing the Islamisation process started under Zia, at least to impede its progress. As expected, supporters and candidates were drawn from the clientele of other PML-hyphen groups. The government made life hard for competing parties. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, former prime ministers, were excluded by decree from standing as candidates; thus, the PPP and the PML-N were deprived of their most popular and charismatic leaders. All candidates had to have at least a bachelor's degree - a condition that may be less wise than appears: it excludes de facto many trade unionists, while allowing graduates of obscure Islamic colleges to stand. The campaign was limited to 40 days, which left very little time for the two popular parties to mobilise, while the state machinery was put at the disposal of the PML-Q. Finally, in keeping with common practice in Westminster-based systems, con-

stituencies were gerrymandered to the great advantage of the new pro-presidential party.

The elections took place in October 2002, and the results took many observers by surprise. The PML-Q did win the largest number of seats, but fell short of absolute majority. The PPP sustained a very small loss of seats, and got more votes than the PML-Q. But the real surprise was the performance of the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). This unprecedented alliance of six Islamist parties became the third-strongest faction in the National Assembly. It won an absolute majority in the NWFP Provincial Assembly, and now forms the government there. It also did well in the Pakhtun-dominated areas of Baluchistan, and governs there in coalition with the PML-Q. This coalition reflects the compromises that Musharaf has made with the Islamist parties in the country as a whole, revealing the cleavage between Musharaf's stated commitments and political expedience.

On closer analysis the result is less surprising than at first sight. The MMA fought an election campaign based on anti-American rhetoric, which was particularly effective among the Pakhtuns, who have suffered most from the events in Afghanistan and the anti-terrorist campaigns in the border regions. By campaigning together for the first time, the Islamist parties were able to marginalise the strong nationalist parties among the Pakhtuns; the electoral system did the rest.

The MMA won 11.3% of the votes. Yet, the electoral system enables a party with just over a tenth of the votes to win a far greater proportion of seats in parliament. Furthermore, the turn-out was very low in 2002: one in two voters stayed at home. The low turn-out probably hurt the popular parties of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif most; yet they still received one quarter and one tenth of the ballots cast, respectively. The composition of parliament has had a substantial effect on day-to-day politics. Since the president's party has rejected a coalition with the PPP or PML-N, it governs with the support of small parties, which gives it a very narrow majority. Therefore the government party has sometimes to seek compromises with the Islamists, with whom they have already formed a coalition in one province. Will the president, his military status notwithstanding, be forced to give in to Islamist demands, as civilian governments have so often done in the past? Can the Kemalist National Security Council effectively curb the imponderables of parliamentary politics, as Musharaf undoubtedly hopes? The answers to these questions depend on the answer to another question: how "Kemalist" is the officers' corps of the Pakistani armed forces?

It is generally - and often wishfully - assumed that most senior officers are either non- or even anti-Islamist, whereas in the middle ranks many officers have been Islamist sympathisers since the time of Zia ul-Haq, who himself was one. But there is no guarantee that this assumption is correct. For years the Pakistani army senior commanders trained, equipped and supported the fighters of radical Islamist organisations against the Soviets in Afghanistan and in the guerrilla war in Kashmir. Their own socialization was also within the same ideological framework, therefore a whole age class of junior and middle officers have the same ideological bent. The "war against terrorism" has forced the Army to turn against their brothers in arms and those they had formerly sponsored. It cannot be easy for them to operate such a major turnabout in a very short period - and to expect a real change of heart among the officers. Military discipline and pride in having the role of the military re-

cognized in the National Security Council may have made this turn easier, but there is no guarantee that all military officers identify with what amounts to a secularisation process.

There is a huge temptation to pragmatically and even cynically grant the Islamists in Pakistan at least some concessions in order to make the about-turn in the government's policies towards Afghanistan and Kashmir more palatable. There are already clear signs that this is happening. The NWFP government is in the process of creating conditions reminiscent of those under the rule of the Afghan Taliban, without the central government taking any action against it: prohibition on music, closure of cinemas, abolition of co-education, separation of the sexes in public life and ever-growing restrictions on movement of women. Another critical indication is the lax supervision of the madrasas, the Islamic religious schools. The authorities have de facto no authority over their teachings and their financing, the debate on placing these madrasas under some kind of federal supervision notwithstanding. The low priority given to education, particularly the poor financing of state schools ensure a steady stream of pupils for this parallel educational system, which is quite well funded by private and international sources. Moreover, it can be predicted that many graduates of these madrasas have little chance in the labour market, neither for white nor for blue collar jobs - except as a potential pool of support for radical tendencies.

For the religious minorities in the country it is disheartening to realize that their fate is increasingly dependent on the ability of an enlightened military elite to retain power.

## II

# Attitudes and Opinions on Society, Religion and Politics

An empirical survey<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The original core questionnaire was designed by Theodor Hanf. It has been contextualised and translated into the three main languages of Pakistan by Charles Amjad-Ali, who also drew the sample and organised the field work. Theodor Hanf alone is responsible for the interpretation of the data in the following chapter and hence for any mistake.

## ONE

### Strata and Cleavages: Pakistani society as reflected in the sample

Attitudes and opinions are coloured by numerous factors. In any society, behaviour is determined by age and gender, urban and rural environments, employment or self-employment. Differences in education and income can also trigger differences in opinions. Hence, it is standard practice in social research to study the relative influence of social factors on attitudes and opinions. However, biological and spatial factors, status and income are inadequate to satisfactorily explain the full range of variance in social and political attitudes.

This is particularly the case when societies are composed of different language and religious groups. In such cases, it is essential to widen the spectrum of parameters used to elucidate the emergence of attitudes and convictions beyond socio-economic aspects to include cultural factors as well.

There are two weaknesses in the data presented in this study. First, they date from 1996 and, second, rural workers are underrepresented.<sup>4</sup> The former shortcoming is compensated by the subject of the study: not opinions on current affairs but attitudes that analyses over the course of a decade in a series of comparable studies (in South Africa, Lebanon, Malaysia, Palestine and Indonesia) on decisive political changes have shown to be very stable.<sup>5</sup> The second limitation is rendered insignificant by the size of the sample (N = 2,948, with a special sample of 809 Christians<sup>6</sup>), which allows us to compare with a sufficient degree of statistical accuracy the attitudes and opinions of respondents from different education and income strata, provinces and occupational groups, on the one hand, and from different ethnic groups and religious communities, on the other.

Fifty-three percent of the respondents are men, 47 percent women. The four age groups - up to 25 years<sup>7</sup>, 25 to 34, 35 to 49 and 50 and over - each account for a quarter of the sample. Twenty-nine percent live in large cities, the rest in a rural environment.

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<sup>4</sup> It is estimated that about half of the total work force in Pakistan is employed in the agricultural sector; in the sample the proportion is one fifth (still 356 respondents). Overall, the world of rural towns and villages comprises 71 percent of the respondents in the sample, an appropriate representation. For this reason, it was decided not to weight the sample.

<sup>5</sup> On the stability of attitudes, cf. e.g. Theodor Hanf, "The Sceptical Nation," in: *idem* and Nawaf Salam, *Lebanon in Limbo*, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2003, pp. 197-228.

<sup>6</sup> This special sample was constructed to highlight the diversity within the Christian communities. In the overall analysis, the proportion of Christians in the sample was reweighted to that in the total population.

<sup>7</sup> In this group women are slightly overrepresented.

The breakdown by occupational group is as follows:

|                                  |    |
|----------------------------------|----|
| Farmers (landowning)             | 1  |
| Liberal professions              | 1  |
| Small business, private services | 3  |
| Teachers, instructors            | 3  |
| White-collar employees           | 11 |
| Government service               | 3  |
| Skilled manual workers           | 20 |
| Labourers                        | 10 |
| Sanitary workers                 | 1  |
| Unskilled and seasonal workers   | 5  |
| Housewives                       | 35 |
| Students                         | 6  |
| Other                            | 1  |

Figures in %, rounded

Women are disproportionately represented among teachers and sanitary workers, men among farmers, seasonal workers, skilled and unskilled workers, white-collar workers and government employees.

The breakdown by level of education is as follows:

|                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------|----|
| No formal education                  | 29 |
| Read & write, up to primary school 3 | 4  |
| Primary school 4 & 5                 | 9  |
| Middle or vocational school          | 19 |
| Matric                               | 22 |
| College                              | 10 |
| Degree                               | 8  |

Figures in %, rounded

Women are disproportionately represented in the two lowest educational strata and men in the middle groups. 38 and 39 percent, respectively, of the respondents in the two highest educational levels are women; once women get a secondary-school leaving certificate, their chances of success at college or university rise substantially.

An important defining factor of educational standard is age. Almost half of all respondents over the age of 50 had no formal education, a figure that dropped to one tenth among those under 25. The vast majority of those in the lowest educational stratum live in rural areas, whereas urban respondents make up a disproportionate number of students at middle school and higher.

The breakdown by income per month is as follows:

|                   |    |
|-------------------|----|
| Under 2,200 Rp    | 21 |
| 2,200 - 2,999 Rp  | 23 |
| 3,000 - 3,499 Rp  | 20 |
| 3,500 - 4,499 Rp  | 18 |
| 4.500 and more Rp | 18 |

Figures in %, rounded



Income rises, as one might expect, with age. Members of the lowest income group are found more in rural areas, those of the highest in towns.

As in most societies, so in Pakistan income correlates with education:

| Income stratum                       | 1 <sup>st</sup><br>(lowest) | 2 <sup>nd</sup> | 3 <sup>rd</sup> | 4 <sup>th</sup> | 5 <sup>th</sup><br>(highest) |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|
| No formal education                  | <b>35</b>                   | 24              | 16              | 15              | 10                           |
| Read & write, up to primary school 3 | <b>32</b>                   | 21              | 17              | 21              | 9                            |
| Primary school 4 & 5                 | 22                          | <b>30</b>       | <b>22</b>       | 16              | 10                           |
| Middle or vocational school          | 16                          | <b>29</b>       | <b>24</b>       | 18              | 13                           |
| Matric                               | 15                          | 23              | <b>25</b>       | <b>23</b>       | 14                           |
| College                              | 15                          | 15              | 18              | 19              | <b>33</b>                    |
| Degree                               | 4                           | 9               | 12              | 11              | <b>64</b>                    |
| ∅                                    | 22                          | 23              | 20              | 18              | 18                           |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

As to be expected, the correlation between occupation and income is equally clear:

| Income stratum                   | 1 <sup>st</sup><br>(lowest) | 2 <sup>nd</sup> | 3 <sup>rd</sup> | 4 <sup>th</sup> | 5 <sup>th</sup><br>(highest) |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|
| Farmers (landowning)             | <b>59</b>                   | 15              | 11              | 2               | 13                           |
| Liberal professions              | 2                           | <b>34</b>       | 3               | -               | <b>60</b>                    |
| Small business, private services | 13                          | 12              | <b>21</b>       | 6               | <b>47</b>                    |
| Teachers, instructors            | 13                          | 7               | 18              | <b>23</b>       | <b>39</b>                    |
| White-collar employees           | 13                          | <b>25</b>       | 20              | <b>24</b>       | 18                           |
| Government service               | 4                           | 9               | <b>30</b>       | 9               | <b>48</b>                    |
| Skilled manual workers           | 13                          | <b>32</b>       | <b>24</b>       | <b>22</b>       | 9                            |
| Labourers                        | <b>42</b>                   | <b>27</b>       | 13              | 10              | 8                            |
| Sanitary workers                 | 8                           | 3               | <b>70</b>       | 8               | 11                           |
| Unskilled and seasonal workers   | <b>37</b>                   | <b>28</b>       | <b>24</b>       | 6               | 5                            |
| Housewives                       | <b>25</b>                   | 22              | 18              | <b>19</b>       | 16                           |
| Students                         | 12                          | 12              | 12              | 18              | <b>46</b>                    |
| Other                            | <b>35</b>                   | <b>28</b>       | 8               | 10              | 19                           |
| ∅                                | 22                          | 23              | 20              | 18              | 18                           |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

Farmers, agricultural labourers, unskilled and seasonal workers often earn very little. Skilled manual workers find themselves in the middle of the income pyramid. As is to be expected, most self-employed persons earn relatively well, although, surprisingly, more than one third of them have low incomes. Teachers, white-collar workers and government employees are among the better off - and almost half the students receive allowances far higher than the average income.

It is noteworthy that the income status of sanitary workers diverges from their social status: more than two thirds of them are in the middle-income group. Furthermore, those that work in private households are overrepresented on one of the two highest income groups. It is obvious that the Pakistani upper class is pre-

pared to spend a lot of money on their children's studies, and to pay others well, to do the work they do not want to do themselves.

How does the sample break down by geographic origins, language and religious affiliation?

Fifty-five percent of respondents were drawn from the Punjab, 26 percent from Sindh, 11 percent from the North-West Frontier Province, seven percent from Baluchistan and one percent from Islamabad, the federal capital.

The distribution by language is as follows:

|         |    |
|---------|----|
| Punjabi | 52 |
| Pashto  | 18 |
| Urdu    | 11 |
| Sindhi  | 8  |
| Baluchi | 3  |
| Hindko  | 3  |
| Saraiki | 2  |
| Other   | 2  |
| English | *  |

Figures in %, rounded; \* well below 1%

In the Punjab, 86 percent of the respondents speak Punjabi and eight percent Urdu. In Sindh 31 percent speak Sindhi, 24 percent Urdu and 14 percent Pashto - a clear indication of migration into this province. The Mohajir, descendants of Muslim refugees and settlers from states incorporated in 1947 into what is now India, speak Urdu. Many Pakhtuns have moved to Karachi for economic reasons. Linguistically the most homogeneous province is the NWFP, where 89 percent speak Pashto and five percent Hindko. Among the respondents in Baluchistan there are more Pashto- than Baluchi-speakers, again a reflection of migration in recent years. In Islamabad half of the respondents speak Punjabi, but only a few less, 47 percent, speak Urdu<sup>8</sup>: as a Mohajir centre, Islamabad is second only to Karachi.

Urdu-speaking respondents are overrepresented among urban inhabitants, teachers, white-collar workers and government employees. More than half of the respondents from the NWFP and Baluchistan are in the lowest income groups, whereas inhabitants of the Punjab and in particular Islamabad are overrepresented in the top two income strata.

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<sup>8</sup> Both English and Urdu are aligned with class and educational status. Speaking Urdu denotes class differentiation amongst the lower middle and the middle middle class. People use Urdu as a status symbol; once acquired, people tend to deny their mother tongues, especially among Punjabis. Thus Islamabad's Urdu percentages reflect not just ethnicity, but also class.

The breakdown by religious affiliation is as follows:

|                                      |    |
|--------------------------------------|----|
| None, human being                    | 1  |
| Sunni                                | 64 |
| Muslim (unspecified)                 | 21 |
| Shi'a                                | 8  |
| Sunni Barailvi                       | 2  |
| Sunni Deobandi                       | 1  |
| Catholic                             | 1  |
| Protestant & Christian (unspecified) | 1  |
| Hindu                                | 1  |
| Parsi                                | *  |

Figures in %, rounded; \* 0.2%

The vast majority of respondents from Baluchistan and the NWFP are Sunnis. Shi'as are found primarily in the Punjab and Sindh. More than four fifths of the Barailvi and Deobandi Sunnis live in the Punjab, the others in Sind. The distribution of Christians is similar: about four fifths live in the Punjab and about one tenth in Sind, whereas in Baluchistan and the NWFP they constitute micro-minorities. Almost all Hindu respondents and the great majority of Parsis live in Sind, the latter almost exclusively in Karachi.

Those that claimed to have no religion or simply to be a human being tend to be white-collar workers, small businessmen, skilled manual workers or government employees. By occupation, the large religious communities - Sunni, unspecified Muslim and Shi'as - diverge little from the normal distribution. This is not necessarily the case for the small minorities. Barailvi and Deobandi Sunni are overrepresented among skilled manual workers, agricultural labourers and seasonal workers. Most Hindus are farmers. Parsis, by contrast, tend to be white-collar workers, in the liberal professions and businessmen.

The Christian groups have their occupational niche: the dirty work, euphemistically termed "sanitary". Of the sanitary workers employed in public service, 44 percent are Catholic, 31 percent Protestant, and unspecified Christians make up the rest. Of those working for private employers, 73 percent are Catholic and the rest unspecified Christians. Another unpopular occupation that has become a Christian niche is brick kiln work.

Most sanitary workers are Christian - our study confirms common knowledge. But the reverse is by no means true: not all, or even most, Christians are sanitary workers.

Their occupational breakdown is as follows:

|                                  | Catholic  | Protestant | Christian<br>(unspecified) | Ø all<br>respondents |
|----------------------------------|-----------|------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Farmers (landowning)             | <b>8</b>  | <b>5</b>   | <b>7</b>                   | 1                    |
| Liberal professions              | 1         | 1          | -                          | 1                    |
| Small business, private services | 2         | 1          | <b>16</b>                  | 3                    |
| Teachers, preachers, instructors | <b>20</b> | <b>11</b>  | <b>10</b>                  | 3                    |
| White-collar employees           | 6         | 7          | 3                          | 11                   |
| Government service               | <b>13</b> | <b>9</b>   | <b>9</b>                   | 3                    |
| Skilled manual workers           | 6         | 9          | 7                          | 20                   |
| Labourers                        | <b>12</b> | 7          | <b>18</b>                  | 10                   |
| Sanitary workers                 | <b>8</b>  | <b>12</b>  | <b>3</b>                   | 1                    |
| Unskilled, seasonal workers      | 3         | 5          | 2                          | 5                    |
| Housewives                       | 14        | 13         | 15                         | 35                   |
| Students                         | <b>7</b>  | <b>19</b>  | <b>8</b>                   | 6                    |
| Other                            | 1         | 1          | 1                          | 1                    |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

Relative to the overall sample, farmers are overrepresented among Christian respondents because of the weighted inclusion of Christian villages in the special survey. Other deviations from the average are just as interesting. A greater proportion of Christians are teachers, preachers and instructors as well as students. Many Christians are employed in church institutions. But an above-average number of Christians are also in government employ. They are underrepresented among skilled and unskilled workers. The comparatively low number of housewives in the special sample is explained by the fact that the proportion of Christian women in gainful employment is well above the national average.

How do the members of the various religious communities differ by education?

| Religious affiliation:                  | None      | Sunni     | Muslim<br>unspec. | Shi'a     | Sunni<br>Barailvi | Sunni<br>Deobandi |
|---|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|
| No formal education                     | 3         | 29        | <b>33</b>         | 27        | 10                | 16                |
| Read & write, up to<br>primary school 3 | 3         | 4         | 4                 | 4         | 1                 | -                 |
| Primary school 4 & 5                    | 10        | 10        | 5                 | 9         | 5                 | <b>21</b>         |
| Middle or vocational<br>school          | <b>29</b> | <b>21</b> | 9                 | <b>25</b> | <b>24</b>         | <b>26</b>         |
| Matric                                  | <b>26</b> | 21        | 23                | 21        | <b>32</b>         | <b>25</b>         |
| College                                 | 6         | 9         | <b>13</b>         | 9         | <b>13</b>         | 9                 |
| Degree                                  | <b>23</b> | 6         | <b>13</b>         | 4         | <b>14</b>         | 2                 |

*Continued*

| Religious affiliation:               | Catholic  | Protestant | Christian unspec. | Hindu     | Parsi      | Ø all respondents |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|-------------------|
| No formal education                  | 29        | 24         | <b>34</b>         | <b>48</b> | -          | 29                |
| Read & write, up to primary school 3 | 3         | 5          | 4                 | <b>9</b>  | -          | 4                 |
| Primary school 4 & 5                 | 6         | 8          | 4                 | 12        | -          | 9                 |
| Middle or vocational school          | 8         | 10         | 7                 | 3         | -          | 19                |
| Matric                               | <b>26</b> | 22         | 19                | 9         | -          | 22                |
| College                              | <b>13</b> | <b>16</b>  | <b>17</b>         | 6         | -          | 10                |
| Degree                               | <b>14</b> | <b>13</b>  | <b>14</b>         | <b>12</b> | <b>100</b> | 8                 |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

The Sunnis, the largest group by far, have a normal distribution. Among their less common variants - Barailvi and Deobandi - noticeably fewer people have a lower education. Most of the minority who claim to have no religion have middle or high level of education. Shi'as are underrepresented among university graduates, but well above average among those with middle- or vocational-school diplomas.

The Christian groups are underrepresented at the middle level of education and overrepresented at high levels. Hindus have the highest proportion of respondents without any formal education. Every single Parsi respondent was a university graduate.

As might be expected, the differences between the religious communities by income are similar to those by education, only a little sharper:

| Religious affiliation:   | None      | Sunni     | Muslim unspec. | Shi'a     | Sunni Barailvi | Sunni Deobandi |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| Income level 1 (lowest)  | 13        | 21        | <b>23</b>      | <b>23</b> | 6              | 14             |
| Income level 2           | 23        | <b>25</b> | 19             | <b>23</b> | 11             | <b>41</b>      |
| Income level 3           | 20        | 20        | 17             | <b>21</b> | <b>39</b>      | 15             |
| Income level 4           | 3         | <b>19</b> | 17             | 12        | <b>28</b>      | <b>25</b>      |
| Income level 5 (highest) | <b>40</b> | 15        | <b>24</b>      | <b>21</b> | 16             | 4              |

*Continued*

| Religious affiliation:   | Catholic  | Protestant | Christian unspec. | Hindu     | Parsi      | Ø all respondents |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------------|-----------|------------|-------------------|
| Income level 1 (lowest)  | 20        | <b>24</b>  | <b>29</b>         | <b>44</b> | -          | 21                |
| Income level 2           | 11        | 4          | 7                 | <b>26</b> | -          | 23                |
| Income level 3           | 19        | 16         | <b>24</b>         | 7         | -          | 20                |
| Income level 4           | 14        | <b>23</b>  | 15                | -         | -          | 18                |
| Income level 5 (highest) | <b>36</b> | <b>32</b>  | <b>25</b>         | <b>22</b> | <b>100</b> | 18                |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

People sceptical about religion are well above average in the highest income group. Hindus are overrepresented in the two lowest. All Parsis are in the highest income group. The three Christian groups show the greatest stratification. Catholics are slightly underrepresented and Protestants and unspecified Christians over-

represented in the lowest income group. Surprisingly, the proportion of all three in the highest income group is well above average. The explanations for this are, first, that almost half of those employed by church institutions are in this group and, second, that - as mentioned above - almost two thirds of the sanitary workers employed in private households are remunerated at income levels 4 and 5. Hence, it should be kept in mind that in the following interpretations of the opinions and attitudes of the Christian minority in particular economic strata do not necessarily correlate with cultural cleavages, or income with social status.

## Two

### Fear of the Future, Trust, Caution and Powerlessness: Psycho-social sensitivities

Just as gender, age, occupation, income, language and religious affiliation can influence perceptions of society and politics, this is equally true of more subjective factors such as trust in one's social environment, fear or confidence, openness to or rejection of change, faith in one's ability to change things or a sense of powerlessness. This section will look at a selection of characteristic personality features that previous intercultural studies have shown to exhibit, as a rule, relatively high stability.

*"I feel uncertain and fearful about my future."*

Fifty-three percent of respondents agree with this statement - less than in countries that have recently experienced a lengthy period of violent conflict, but still a clear indication of insecurity on the part of a small majority. Fear of the future is above average among farmers, small businessmen, teachers and unskilled workers, in particular sharecroppers, tenants and sanitary workers in private households, of whom more than 90 percent agree with the statement. By contrast, fear of the future is relatively low among the liberal professions, government employees and skilled manual workers. It also correlates inversely with education. By province, fear of the future is strongest in Baluchistan, which is plagued by ethnic conflict, and weakest in the capital Islamabad.

This fear varies strongly by religious affiliation. The small Muslim minorities of the Barailvi and Deobandi express relatively little fear, 32 and 31 percent, respectively, as do the Parsis with a below-average 43 percent. Among Hindus, 87 percent express fear of the future, as do three fifths of Christians, both figures well above average.

As a rule, fear is linked with caution.

*"One should be sure that something really works before taking a chance on it."*

Two thirds of all respondents agree with this statement. Women tend to be more cautious than men, and by age the youngest group is most cautious. Ninety-seven percent of sanitary workers and 96% of farmers, but only 56% of skilled manual workers are afraid to take risks.<sup>9</sup> By region, people are particularly cautious in Baluchistan and in Islamabad. This attitude is very noticeable among members of non-Muslim minorities: 86 percent of Protestants, 94 percent of unspecified

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<sup>9</sup> Caution is most pronounced among sharecroppers, tenants, brickyard and mineworkers and employees in small businesses and private households: none of them disagree.

Christians, 96 percent of Catholics, 97 percent of Hindus and every single Parsi respondent.

*"If you try to change things you usually make them worse."*

This item measures conservative resistance to and aversion to change. It holds for a good two fifths of all respondents, and is particularly common among sanitary and brickyard workers. The highest educational and income strata express the least resistance to change. By religious affiliation, Hindus and Shi'as are particularly averse to change, whereas opposition among Protestants and Catholics is well below the average, and lowest among respondents with no religion.

*"One must be very cautious with people; you cannot trust the people who live and work around you."*

No less than 69 percent of respondents agree with this. Small businessmen and unskilled manual workers, sanitary workers in private households - and no less than 91 percent of those in church employ - are distrustful of their social environment. Those with below-average distrust include respondents in the highest educational and income strata. As with fear of the future and caution, distrust is greatest in Baluchistan, where 91 percent of respondents express it. Once again, religious minorities diverge substantially from the average: only 57 percent of Parsis, but 83 percent of Barailvi, 82 percent of Hindus and 74 percent of Catholics distrust the people among whom they live and work.

Fear of the future, caution, resistance to change and social distrust are closely related. An above-average proportion of people who are afraid of the future tend to be cautious, distrustful and sceptical about any change. This syndrome is particularly pronounced among people in a precarious occupational or economic situation. It is also characteristic of the religious minorities - with one exception: despite high levels of fear, caution and distrust, neither Protestants nor Catholics think change must be for the worse.

In this society with such pronounced social distrust, whom do people trust?

*"People trust and feel close to some people and not to others. For each of the following types, tell us whether or not you feel close to and trust them."*

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

|   | Trust or<br>feel close to |
|---|---------------------------|
| Family  | 83                        |
| Friends                                       | 82                        |
| People of my religion                         | 80                        |
| Neighbours                                    | 76                        |
| People of my own group                        | 69                        |
| People from my village/town/home district     | 67                        |
| People with the same work and life conditions | 66                        |
| People I play sports with                     | 65                        |
| All Pakistanis                                | 41                        |

Figures in %, rounded



Family, friends and co-religionists make up the narrow circle of those people whom four in five respondents trust. Beyond it trust declines in small steps. It is noteworthy, however, that four out of ten respondents indicate trust in all fellow countrymen.

The correlation between the responses is high enough to construct a statistical scale of "trust",<sup>10</sup> in which responses are distributed as follows:

|                |    |
|----------------|----|
| No trust       | 10 |
| Little trust   | 14 |
| Average trust  | 21 |
| High trust     | 17 |
| Complete trust | 38 |

Figures in %, rounded

Women are less trusting than men; the oldest age group have little trust, the youngest a high level. In rural areas distrust is twice as high as in cities. Students, farmers, small businessmen and government employees are particularly likely to be distrustful, whereas complete trust is common among agricultural labourers and skilled manual workers. Remarkably, 61 percent of those in church employ come under the category "no trust".

Those in the highest educational and income groups are more likely to have no trust than other respondents, whereas high trust is frequent among respondents with average education and income. Islamabad is a city of distrust: here 56 percent of respondents have no or little trust in others.

Distrust is characteristic of Christian minorities: 39 percent of Protestants and 49 percent of Catholics have no or little trust. By contrast, a high level of trust is particularly common among the Deobandi and Barailvi.

*"There is very little a person like me can do to improve the life of people in my country."*

This statement measures self-perception of social effectiveness. Do people feel powerless or do they believe that they can influence the fate of their fellow human beings? A good half of all respondents, 56 percent, manifest a feeling of powerlessness. By occupation, this feeling is most common among farmers, agricultural labourers and sanitary workers employed in private households. It correlates inversely with education and income. By religious community, it is strongest among Hindus at 100 percent, followed by Parsis at 71 percent and Deobandi at 69 percent. By contrast, only 44 percent of those who claim to have no religion feel powerless.

To summarise: the psycho-social sensitivities among Pakistanis appear to be muted and pessimistic. More than half are afraid of the future, two thirds are extremely cautious and two fifths resist any change. Two in three respondents do not trust their social environment. Trust is limited to a close circle of family, friends and

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<sup>10</sup> Alpha = .8328.

co-religionists. Half of the respondents feel powerless and do not believe that they can influence change.

Fear, caution, distrust and powerlessness is the mood among modest people experiencing occupational or job insecurity on the one hand and among minorities on the other. The fact that Catholics, Protestants and people without religion are least opposed to change is not a contradiction: change for them could hardly be a change for the worse.

## THREE

### A Lower-Class Society in Search of Equality: Perceptions of the economy and society

The following question measures inclinations to invest and consume:

*"Imagine that you luckily inherit a lot of money. On which one of the following would you spend more than on others?"*

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <i>Starting a business</i>                                   | 57 |
| <i>Investing in a bank with good profit</i>                  | 7  |
| <i>Enjoying to spend the money on myself or on my family</i> | 18 |
| <i>Improving my house and my furniture</i>                   | 18 |

Figures in %, rounded

Almost two thirds of the respondents gave investment precedence over consumption either by themselves or their family. Men tend more to starting their own business, while an above-average number of women would improve their house, furniture or other living conditions. Eighty-five percent of sanitary workers dream of their own business, as do 81 percent of government employees. Almost all respondents employed in a workshop or car repair garage would like to open their own business. One third of students would use the money to party. The preference for one's own business correlates directly with education, and is most pronounced in the highest income groups. People with no formal education and little money are more likely to want to improve their living conditions.

Unspecified Christians, respondents without any religious affiliation, Barailvi and Catholics are overrepresented among potential business owners. Parsis are far more inclined than members of other religions to invest money with a bank.

*"Which one of the following things in your opinion is the most important for achieving success in life?"*

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Working hard for yourself                            | 35 |
| Education  | 18 |
| Working with others and standing together as a group | 15 |
| Experience   | 8  |
| Connections (knowing the right people)               | 7  |
| Good fortune/Luck                                    | 6  |
| What your parents taught you                         | 6  |
| Inheritance  | 2  |
| Religious belief                                     | 2  |
| Tricks   | 1  |

Figures in %, rounded

Three quarters of all respondents think performance-oriented factors are decisive for personal success: hard work, education, working with others and experience. Only 14 percent believe in fortuitous factors such as connections, luck and chance. The conviction that hard work is the most important reason for success rises with age, while the youngest respondents tend to opt for education. Manual workers, independent farmers and sharecroppers are overrepresented among those that believe in hard work. Education is particularly important for members of the highest educational and income stratum and for people in occupations in which they have done well or hope to do well: liberal professions, teachers, government employees and students. Sanitary workers in particular believe in group solidarity, whereas agricultural and seasonal workers put their hope in good fortune, the advantage of which they have learnt in their work.

Christian respondents' conviction in the benefits of hard work is well above average: 61 percent of Catholics and 59 percent of Protestants. Half of the Hindu respondents picked group solidarity as the most important factor for success. Protestants in particular are inclined to view religious belief as a factor of success in life.

*"What kind of job would you prefer:*

*A job in a factory or in an office with a good salary you can rely on?*

*Or:*

*Your own business where you can win a lot or lose a lot?"*

Thirty-seven percent opted for a salaried job, while 63 percent would prefer their own business with its attendant risks. Farmers desire what they do not have: a job with a salary. Respondents employed in the private sector are heavily overrepresented among those who would like to be self-employed. This option is particularly popular among the Pakhtuns, two thirds of which favour it.

How satisfied are respondents with their jobs and their situation in life?

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <i>"Of course, people always like to earn more, but I consider my income to be reasonable."</i>                | 44 |
| <i>"Young men and women in my community have a reasonable good chance of reaching their goals in life".</i>    | 40 |
| <i>"I am afraid that our children might not enjoy as high a standard of living as we have."</i>                | 53 |
| <i>"Whatever my personal efforts are in Pakistan, I will not get the education and jobs I am entitled to".</i> | 67 |
| <i>"If I could, I would change to another kind of work."</i>   | 68 |

Figures in %, rounded

A substantial minority of 44 percent are satisfied with their income. A smaller proportion believes that the younger generation is likely to have a satisfactory life. A small majority fear that their children will have a lower standard of living. A good two thirds take the view that they have a worse education and job than they merit. And an even higher proportion would like to change their job.

As four of the five items correlate closely with one another, it is possible to construct a scale of "job dissatisfaction".<sup>11</sup> The distribution of the respondents is as follows:

|                   |    |
|-------------------|----|
| Very satisfied    | 10 |
| Satisfied         | 12 |
| In the middle     | 26 |
| Dissatisfied      | 29 |
| Very dissatisfied | 24 |

Figures in %, rounded

Only a good fifth are very satisfied or satisfied, compared to a good half of respondents who described themselves as very dissatisfied or dissatisfied. Students, businessmen, government employees tend to be less dissatisfied, as do sanitary workers and members of the upper educational and income groups.<sup>12</sup> The greatest number of dissatisfied people is found in the NWFP, Baluchistan and Sind, whereas residents of Islamabad are least dissatisfied.

An above-average number of women, sanitary workers and respondents with a low level of education and income worry about their children's standard of living. By religious affiliation, 56 percent of Shi'as, 64 percent of Hindus and all the Parsis believe that their children will be worse off than they themselves are.

*"When you think about your progress in life, in your work and home, with whom do you compare yourself most often?"*

The responses in descending order of frequency are as follows:

|                               |    |
|-------------------------------|----|
| Punjabis                      | 26 |
| Westerners                    | 23 |
| People like you ten years ago | 16 |
| Rich businessmen              | 14 |
| Nobody                        | 10 |
| Pakhtuns                      | 5  |
| Sindis                        | 3  |
| Baluchis                      | 2  |
| Mohajirs                      | 1  |

Figures in %, rounded

One tenth of the respondents do not compare themselves with anybody, 16 percent only with themselves as they were ten years ago and well over a third with other Pakistanis, for the most part from the same group. Only 14 percent take rich businessmen as a measure. Just less than one quarter, for the most part men, urban dwellers, and skilled manual and white-collar workers, measure themselves against westerners, probably an indication of a desire to modernize rather than of envy.

<sup>11</sup> Want to change work, income NOT reasonable, no adequate education and job, young generation will NOT reach goals in life. Alpha = .5084.

<sup>12</sup> Seventy-seven percent of the respondents in church employ fall into the middle category.

This is confirmed by the reactions to another statement:

*"When I see what the rich have I feel that I should have the same."*

Social envy is expressed by one third of all respondents and is stronger among women than men and in rural areas than in cities. It correlates inversely with age. It is above average among sanitary workers at 93 percent, farmers at 60 percent and teachers at 56 percent.

By religious affiliation it is particularly strong among unspecified Christians at 74 percent, Catholics and Protestants both at 63 percent and Hindus at 59 percent.

Overall though, the finding that one third of respondents agree with this statement of social envy is considerably lower than results of studies in other countries.<sup>13</sup> This finding is all the more notable as a large majority are convinced that social differences are increasing and take a very sober view of their own economic situation, as shall be seen below.

*"In the last five years, has the difference between rich and poor in Pakistan:*

|                            |    |
|----------------------------|----|
| <i>Increased</i>           | 81 |
| <i>Decreased</i>           | 5  |
| <i>Remained the same?"</i> | 14 |

Figures in %, rounded

Four fifths believe that inequality has increased. This view is more frequent in urban than in rural areas and much more common among skilled than unskilled workers. The only groups in which a majority believe that that inequality is decreasing are the highest income stratum and residents of the capital.

*"Here are two descriptions of the social differences in Pakistan. With which one do you agree?"*

*A small minority has most of the wealth at the expense of the majority of poor people*

*Or:*

*A majority of people are in the middle class, with fewer people who are rich or poor."*

Almost three quarters of respondents agreed with the first statement; only one quarter believe they live in a middle-class society. Belief in an exploitative, rich minority is particularly pronounced among sanitary workers, teachers, white-collar workers and small businessmen. The view of a middle-class society is held by an above-average proportion of Protestants (49 percent), Shi'as (37 percent) and Catholics and unspecified Christians (each 36 percent).

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<sup>13</sup> E.g. 72 percent in Lebanon, 75 percent in the Congo, and 57 percent in Georgia.

How do people assess the development in their personal economic situation?

*"As regards your money situation, are you better or worse off today than five years ago?"*

|                       |    |
|-----------------------|----|
| <i>Better</i>         | 17 |
| <i>About the same</i> | 41 |
| <i>Worse</i>          | 42 |

Figures in %, rounded

Above all, young people, the liberal professions and teachers, university graduates and high-earners feel better off. Those who feel that their economic situation has deteriorated are overrepresented among the oldest respondents, sanitary workers, skilled and unskilled workers, middle- and vocational-school graduates and members of the lowest income group.

Half of the Shi'a respondents and just less than half of the Barailvi believe that their situation has deteriorated. By contrast, an above-average 35-40 percent of the Christians feel that they are better off financially.

How do the respondents categorise themselves by stratum in Pakistani society?

*"Some people say that there are different levels in society which others call classes. Here we are thinking of levels and not of groups with different languages/ethnic groups. To what level in society would you be closest to?"*

The distribution of replies is as follows:

|                    |    |
|--------------------|----|
| Upper class        | *  |
| Upper middle class | 1  |
| Middle class       | 24 |
| Lower middle class | 14 |
| Lower class        | 61 |

Figures in %, rounded; \* less than 1%

In many societies interviewees are reluctant to place themselves in higher classes; as a rule, people tend to classify themselves in the middle. The former behaviour is true of Pakistan, too, but the latter not: a clear majority of society view themselves as lower class. The tiny fraction that categorise themselves as upper class are older, rural and generally highly educated - and in government employ. Self-classified upper middle class are younger, urban, self-employed, white-collar workers and students. The middle class also consists for the most part of younger, urban people, but also small businessmen, teachers, government employees and students as well as sanitary workers. Members of the lower middle class tend to be teachers and government employees, church employees and many sanitary workers. Finally, those who see themselves as lower class are old, rural, skilled and unskilled manual workers, sanitary workers employed in private households; the majority of them also have a low level of education.

A comparison of self-classification and reported income reveals an interesting pattern:

| Income group       | 1 <sup>st</sup><br>(lowest) | 2 <sup>nd</sup> | 3 <sup>rd</sup> | 4 <sup>th</sup> | 5 <sup>th</sup><br>(highest) |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------------------|
| Upper class        | -                           | -               | -               | -               | 1                            |
| Upper middle class | -                           | -               | -               | 1               | 6                            |
| Middle class       | 12                          | 18              | 21              | <b>25</b>       | <b>45</b>                    |
| Lower middle class | 9                           | 10              | 14              | 13              | <b>23</b>                    |
| Lower class        | <b>79</b>                   | <b>73</b>       | <b>65</b>       | <b>61</b>       | <b>24</b>                    |
| ∅                  | 21                          | 23              | 20              | 18              | 18                           |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values; \* less than 1%

There is a disproportionately common tendency among respondents of all income groups, from the lowest to the highest, to classify themselves as lower class - even almost one quarter of the highest income group does so. There appears to be a huge gap between self-perception and reality.

How does self-classification differ by religion?

| Religious affiliation: | None      | Sunni     | Muslim<br>unspec. | Shi'as    | Sunni<br>Barailvi | Sunni<br>Deobandi |
|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Upper middle class     | <b>6</b>  | 1         | 1                 | -         | -                 | -                 |
| Middle class           | 21        | 21        | <b>34</b>         | 23        | <b>33</b>         | 8                 |
| Lower middle class     | 3         | 14        | 14                | 9         | 8                 | 11                |
| Lower class            | <b>70</b> | <b>64</b> | 51                | <b>67</b> | 59                | <b>81</b>         |

*Continued*

| Religious affiliation: | Catholic  | Protestant | Christian<br>unspec. | Hindu     | Parsi     | ∅ all<br>respondents |
|------------------------|-----------|------------|----------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------|
| Upper middle class     | 1         | 1          | 2                    | <b>9</b>  | <b>71</b> | 1                    |
| Middle class           | <b>28</b> | <b>30</b>  | 24                   | 15        | <b>29</b> | 24                   |
| Lower middle class     | <b>38</b> | <b>37</b>  | <b>32</b>            | -         | -         | 14                   |
| Lower class            | 33        | 32         | 42                   | <b>76</b> | -         | 61                   |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values; upper class less than 1%

This table reveals that self-effacement is far more prevalent among the Muslim majority than among minorities. Christians in particular have no hesitation in classifying themselves as middle class. As seen above, Christians are more likely than Muslims to view Pakistan as a middle-class society. Perhaps here the wish is father to the thought.

*"The most important differences are between rich and poor people in all groups, whatever group they belong to."*

No less than 84 percent of respondents share this opinion. Hindus and Parsis are underrepresented; differences between their communities and the majority of the population may appear to be more important than poverty for the former and relative prosperity for the latter.



What does a society that perceives itself as predominantly lower class see as the causes of poverty?

*"Poor people have only themselves to blame for their situation."*

This heartless explanation is shared by 45% of the respondents, among whom sanitary workers are overrepresented as well as 60 percent of those who admit to social envy. Groups in which an above-average proportion disagrees with this statement include factory, transport and mineworkers and sharecroppers - and church employees.

What social policy would people like the government to adopt?

*"What kind of government would you prefer:*

*A government which tries to make all people as equal as possible in wages, housing and education, even if incomes are heavily taxed*

*Or:*

*A government which allows people who are clever and work hard to become wealthier than others, even if some remain permanently poor."*

No less than 86 percent of respondents would like the government to promote equality, even if it means higher taxes. This result is hardly surprising in the light of the findings analysed above. In general, the respondents have a strong working ethic: they are willing to invest rather than consume and view hard work, education, experience and cooperation as the basis for success. But four in five respondents classify themselves as lower or lower middle class. Similarly, four in five believe that society is exploited by a small, rich minority, and three in four are convinced that the gap between rich and poor is widening. Only a few of them are better off than a few years ago. More than half are dissatisfied with their job. So it is almost astonishing that only one third of all respondents express social envy. But the great majority want a government that will do something to improve social equality.

## FOUR

### A Religious Society: Religion, ethnicity and identity

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <i>"I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished."</i>                                   | 98 |
| <i>"No matter what peoples' religious beliefs are, the only important thing is that everybody leads a responsible life and is a good human being."</i> | 96 |
| <i>"I try hard to live my daily life according to the teachings of my religion."</i>   | 90 |
| <i>"I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one."</i>   | 87 |
| <i>"Whatever people say, there are hidden forces of good and evil which may help or harm me."</i>  | 79 |
| <i>"I can be happy and enjoy life without believing in God."</i>   | 2  |

Agreement in %, rounded

A number of countries have notably religious populations: South Africa, the Congo and, not least, the Palestinian territories. Pakistan is more religious than all of them.

Almost all respondents believe in a life after death in which people will receive their just desserts. Almost as many are convinced that living responsibly is the most important thing, regardless of a person's religious beliefs. Nine in ten respondents try to live their daily lives according to the teachings of their religion. Not many fewer also believe that their religion is the only true one.<sup>14</sup> But just less than four in five also believe in hidden forces, both good and evil, that may help or harm people - which is not really compatible with the precepts of the monotheistic religions, and in Pakistan is obviously a relic of earlier times.<sup>15</sup>

More significant though: only two percent can imagine a happy life without believing in God.<sup>16</sup>

Do people practise their religion?

*"How often do you pray?"*

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<sup>14</sup> This conviction falls slightly with increasing level of education. It is shared by almost all Baluchis and Pakhtuns. By religious affiliation, unspecified Christians, Shi'as and Catholics in particular with 94, 93, 92 percent, respectively, believe that their religion is the only true one.

<sup>15</sup> Almost all who are literally pagani or country people - farmers, sharecroppers and seasonal labourers - believe in hidden forces, as do almost all Hindus and Catholics.

<sup>16</sup> They are overrepresented among the highest educational and income strata and also in Islamabad. Among Catholics they account for five percent.

The breakdown of replies is as follows:

|             |    |
|-------------|----|
| Regularly   | 41 |
| Often       | 19 |
| Sometimes   | 35 |
| Hardly ever | 3  |
| Never       | 1  |

Figures in %, rounded

Six in ten respondents pray regularly<sup>17</sup> or often, and just four percent hardly ever or never.<sup>18</sup>

*"Do you go to religious services?"*

|                          |    |
|--------------------------|----|
| Yes, once a week or more | 56 |
| Sometimes                | 35 |
| Hardly ever              | 6  |
| Never                    | 3  |

Figures in %, rounded

In the light of the fact that in many places it is unusual for Muslim women to pray together, the proportion of respondents attending weekly services is particularly high. This explains why women's attendance at places of worship is below average, although they are overrepresented among respondents that pray regularly.<sup>19</sup> Weekly attendance at religious services is above average for the Deobandi and Barailvi as well as for other Sunni, slightly below average for Christians and well below average for Shi'as.

The high correlation between the replies to religion and religious practice enables the construction of a scale of religiosity<sup>20</sup> with the following distribution

|                    |    |
|--------------------|----|
| Not religious      | 1  |
| Hardly religious   | 1  |
| Somewhat religious | 7  |
| Religious          | 18 |
| Very religious     | 73 |

Figures in %, rounded

As in most societies, women are overrepresented among the very religious. However, there are interesting distinctions by occupation. Students are overrepresented among both the very and the not religious. Farmers and self-employed are particularly common among the hardly religious. Among the somewhat religious, small businessmen, self-employed white-collar workers and unskilled workers, are overrepresented. Three in five sanitary workers are religious. Besides students, the

<sup>17</sup> Deobandi and Barailvi particularly frequently, but also all the Christian groups.

<sup>18</sup> Those who responded "never" are overrepresented in the highest educational and income stratum, among the inhabitants of Islamabad, people who did not mention any religion and Parsis.

<sup>19</sup> Thirty-two percent of women, compared to 62 percent of men.

<sup>20</sup> Life after death, own religion the only true one, life lived in accordance with religious teachings, NOT happy unless belief in God, regular, frequent and occasional prayer. Alpha = .6377.

very religious include above-average proportions of farmers, government employees, manual workers, sharecroppers and church employees.

Education plays a role in the degree of religiosity. The minorities that are not, hardly or somewhat religious tend to have a higher level of education than others. The proportion of very religious is highest among respondents without any formal education, falls slightly through primary, middle and secondary school graduates to rise again in the two highest educational groups.

Although there are no significant differences by income, there are by province. At 30 percent, the proportion of non- and hardly religious is well above average in Islamabad. The proportion of very religious is very high in Baluchistan at 78 percent and highest in the NWFP at 90 percent.

There are also significant differences by religious affiliation. Seventy-eight percent of the Shi'as and 75 percent of the Sunni are very religious, while in this category Deobandi and unspecified Muslims are underrepresented. Four in five Hindus and Protestants are very religious, as are three in four Catholics and unspecified Christians. Finally, a noteworthy finding: 29 percent of those who do not belong to any religious community or classify themselves first and foremost as human beings are also in the category of the very religious.

How much solidarity is there between members of the ethno-linguistic and religious groups?

|  | agree |
|--|-------|
| <i>"I prefer to be with people who speak my own language."</i>   | 67    |
| <i>"I feel very close to people of my own religion, whatever their education, wealth or political views."</i>                              | 66    |
| <i>"I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different language/ethnic group if they loved each other."</i> | 29    |
| <i>"I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other."</i>                      | 6     |

Figures in %, rounded

Two thirds of the respondents prefer to mix with people who speak the same language, and almost as many feel the same way about people of the same religion, regardless of social status or political orientation. Mixed marriages across ethnic barriers are accepted by less than one third of all respondents and interreligious marriages by just six percent.

Ethno-linguistic identification is weakest among the liberal professions and government employees and among respondents in the highest educational group. It is above-average among members of the small language groups, Hindko, Saraiki and Pashto, and strongest among the tiny group of mother-tongue English-speakers. It is also far higher among Hindus, Parsis and Christians than among Muslims. Solidarity with co-religionists is stronger among rural respondents than urban dwellers, and among Baluchis and Pakhtuns than other language groups. By religious affiliation, identification is strongest among the Parsis, followed by Hindus, Christians and Deobandi. As to be expected, it is weakest among respondents with no religion.

Approval of mixed ethnic marriages is greater among men than women, in cities than in the country, and in Islamabad and the Punjab than in other parts of the country,<sup>21</sup> and at 46 percent far above average among Urdu-speakers. By religious affiliation, Catholics, at 49 percent, have the fewest objections to such marriages.

Approval of interreligious mixed marriages is more common among women, young people and respondents with a high education and income than among men, older people, the less educated and low-earners. By region, such approval is highest in Islamabad in the Punjab; marriage across religious barriers is rejected by every single respondent in Baluchistan. None of the Barailvi, Deobandi and Hindus in the sample accepts it either. However, 13 percent of Protestants, 17 percent of Catholics and 20 percent of unspecified Christians do. Acceptance is greatest among the Parsis at 29 percent.

What roles do religion, ethnicity and other factors play in people's cultural self-determination? The following question has proved effective in exploring people's views of themselves:

*"People in a country can be in different social groups at the same time. You have a job, a religion, a language, a country, you live in a village or a town - and all these things may be of different importance to you.*

*If somebody asks you what you are, how would you describe yourself?*

*In the first place?  
In the second place?  
In the third place?"*

The responses in descending order of first choices are as follows:

|                  | 1 <sup>st</sup> place | 2 <sup>nd</sup> place | 3 <sup>rd</sup> place |
|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Muslim           | <b>35</b>             | 18                    | 8                     |
| Religion         | <b>22</b>             | 6                     | 2                     |
| Pakistani        | 21                    | <b>42</b>             | 17                    |
| Myself, family   | 7                     | 3                     | 3                     |
| Human being      | 5                     | 2                     | 3                     |
| Occupation       | 4                     | 9                     | 22                    |
| Language         | 3                     | 9                     | <b>24</b>             |
| Ethnic group*    | 2                     | 10                    | <b>17</b>             |
| Christian, Hindu | 1                     | 1                     | 3                     |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values; \* including "region" and "area"

Respondents' ranking of factors of identity to describe themselves is unequivocal: a clear majority put religion first, nationality second and language or ethnicity third.

Correlating the first, second and third options with one another increases the complexity of the overall picture, but does not change the basic structure.

<sup>21</sup> Only nine-percent acceptance in the NWFP.

| 1 <sup>st</sup> place | 2 <sup>nd</sup> place   | 3 <sup>rd</sup> place   |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Muslim                | 66% Pakistani<br>10% language<br>7% ethnic group<br>7% occupation   | 31% language<br>27% occupation<br>17% Pakistani                     |
| Religion              | 62% Pakistani<br>11% language<br>7% region, area                    | 30% language<br>24% Pakistani<br>14% occupation<br>13% ethnic group |
| Pakistani             | 53% Muslim<br>17% religion<br>8% language<br>7% occupation          | 24% language<br>23% occupation<br>18% Muslim<br>11% ethnic group    |
| Myself, family        | 35% occupation<br>24% region, area<br>10% ethnic group              | 35% occupation<br>20% ethnic group<br>14% region, area              |
| Human being           | 46% Muslim<br>36% Pakistani<br>8% ethnic group                      | 34% Pakistani<br>22% occupation<br>13% ethnic group<br>12% Muslim   |
| Occupation            | 34% Muslim<br>36% Pakistani<br>11% ethnic group                     | 31% Pakistani<br>21% Muslim<br>19% language                         |
| Language              | 31% Muslim<br>31% Pakistani<br>13% religion<br>12% occupation       | 39% Pakistani<br>26% Muslim<br>21% occupation                       |
| Ethnic group          | 34% Muslim<br>21% Pakistani<br>16% occupation<br>16% myself, family | 24% Muslim<br>22% occupation<br>20% myself, family                  |
| Christian             | 70% Pakistani<br>10% language<br>10% occupation<br>10% human being  | 33% language<br>33% occupation<br>22% Pakistani                     |

Figures in %, rounded

The overwhelming majority of respondents see themselves first as Muslims and second as Pakistanis. Even those who chose "human being", occupation, language or ethnic group as their first option, chose the Islamic religion and nationality as their second or third options. The identity of the Christian minority is very similar: they are Christians and Pakistanis. Only seven percent of all respondents do not follow this pattern: they see themselves first as individuals or as family members; religion and nationality do not play a strong role in these respondents' identity, but occupation and ethnicity do.

To summarise: in Pakistan the degree of religiosity as measured by religious convictions and religious practice is exceptionally high. Religion is the most important factor in people's cultural identification. Besides religion, significant factors that play a role in defining individual identity include nationality, ethno-linguistic background and, far behind, occupation. People prefer the society of people who speak the same language and, even more so, have the same religious affiliation. Ethnic and, in particular, religious endogamy are regarded as normal by the vast majority of the population. There is no likelihood in even the distant future that intermarriage could faintly threaten ethnic and religious groupings. Available evidence indicates that religiosity and ethno-religious solidarity are mutually supportive, which gives identity structures great stability.

## FIVE

### State and Theocracy: Opinions on the relationship between religion and politics

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <i>"Religion is a matter between God and an individual - the country is for everybody."</i>              | 94 |
| <i>"(To me) religion is more important than politics."</i>   | 90 |
| <i>"Obviously there are group differences in this country, but they should be kept out of politics."</i> | 89 |
| <i>"Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state."</i>                     | 70 |
| <i>"Religious leaders should stay clear of politics."</i>  | 56 |

Figures in %, rounded

The first statement is a variation on the slogan of the liberal Wafd Party in Egypt, which sought to separate religion and politics and create unity with the concept of love for the fatherland. It was adopted by many modernising political forces in the Arab and wider Muslim world. An overwhelming majority of the Pakistani respondents agree with this statement.<sup>22</sup> A slightly smaller majority agrees that to them personally religion is more important than politics. This view is disproportionately common among women, among rural people and respondents with no formal education,<sup>23</sup> but also among members of the Christian and Hindu minorities;<sup>24</sup> preference for religion over politics obviously goes together with the feeling of political impotence.

Almost nine in ten respondents are also of the opinion that undeniable group differences should be kept out of politics. Support for this view is above-average among men, younger people and students. It is also higher in Islamabad, the Punjab and Baluchistan than in Sind and the NWFP. It is shared by above-average proportions of most minorities: Christians, Hindus and Parsis - which is not surprising, as this statement obviously reflects the interest of minorities.

It is a standard demand of fundamentalists of all religions that belief and religious values should determine all aspects of society and state. Are 70 percent of the respondents fundamentalists? An analysis of agreement allows for a more differentiated interpretation: agreement is greater among women than men, in rural than urban areas and among the uneducated than the educated. Among sanitary workers, small businessmen and students there is very strong support, among white-collar workers, skilled manual workers and the liberal professions far less. It is not surprising that 81 percent of the Deobandi agree, or that four fifths of the Hindus and Parsis are against. However, the different reactions among Christians are unexpected: 86 percent of unspecified Christians and 73 percent of Catholics

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<sup>22</sup> Including almost all respondents in the youngest age group and the highest educational stratum.

<sup>23</sup> Almost all sanitary workers agree.

<sup>24</sup> However, agreement among Parsis is far below-average at only 57 percent.



agree, and even 63 percent of Protestants. Do the Christians want to keep up with the Muslims in demands for a society in which religion colours everything?

Among those who approve are almost certainly a number of convinced fundamentalists -we shall return to them below. But the social composition of the large number who agree with this statement are constituted by those who are disadvantaged in terms of education and occupation, and who expect that giving greater consideration to faith and religious values will improve their lot.

Responses to the statement that clerics should keep out of politics put in sharper perspective the support for and opposition to the separation of religion and politics. More than half the respondents support this demand. They are strongly overrepresented among the inhabitants of Islamabad and underrepresented in Sind and the NWFP. But the differences are greatest by religious affiliation:

|                        |    |
|------------------------|----|
| Deobandi               | 21 |
| Barailvi               | 47 |
| Unspecified Muslims    | 53 |
| Sunnis                 | 54 |
| Shi'as                 | 71 |
| Parsis                 | 71 |
| Unspecified Christians | 74 |
| Hindus                 | 76 |
| No religion stated     | 79 |
| Catholics              | 81 |
| Protestants            | 82 |

Figures in %, rounded

The picture is clear: Deobandi Sunnis want (their) clerics to play a political role, a majority of all the minorities, from the Shi'as to the Protestants, do not want a political role for clerics (i.e., probably, for clerics of other communities). Unspecified Muslims and the Sunni majority group are split, with a small majority for those against.

The following question deals directly with the fundamentalist concept of the state:

*"Which kind of government would you prefer?*

*A government which makes laws to make sure that people live according to the rules of religion.*

*Or:*

*A government which believes that there should be no enforcement in matters of religion and which leaves religion to the believers' conscience."*

Forty-seven percent approve of legislation to ensure observance of religious rules; a narrow majority of 53 percent are against. Support is above average among small businessmen, sharecroppers and the self-employed<sup>25</sup> and respondents with the least and most education. Disapproval of this view is well above average among

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<sup>25</sup> Once again church employees are good for a surprise: 38 percent of them approve of government legislation to enforce religious observance.

sanitary workers, farmers, teachers, skilled and unskilled manual workers, white-collar workers and middle-school graduates. Agreement correlates directly with income.<sup>26</sup> Small majorities of 51 percent in Sind and the NWFP favour government intervention, whereas 69 percent of respondents in Islamabad and 62 percent in Baluchistan disapprove. A majority of Pakhtuns are for, and 69 and 61 percent of Sindhi and Baluchi-speakers, respectively, are against.

Sixty-seven percent of the Barailvi, 70 percent of respondents that did not mention any religion, 76 percent of the Catholics and Protestants,<sup>27</sup> 85 percent of the Hindus and all Parsis are also opposed. The Sunni majority splits much as the whole sample does.

The high correlation between the responses to nine items<sup>28</sup> permits the creation of a scale of fundamentalism<sup>29</sup> with the following distribution for the sample:

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Not fundamentalist (0, 1 items)           | 5  |
| Hardly fundamentalist (2, 3 items)        | 29 |
| Partially fundamentalist (4, 5 items)     | 48 |
| Predominantly fundamentalist (6, 7 items) | 16 |
| Completely fundamentalist (8, 9 items)    | 2  |

Figures in %, rounded

This scale highlights how fluid the transition between conventional conservative religious attitudes and rigorous fundamentalism is.<sup>30</sup> The hard fundamentalist core comprises less than one fifth of all respondents, but almost half of them share various aspects of the fundamentalists' view of the world. Only a good third is basically immune to fundamentalist impulses.

Who is more fundamentalist and who is less? Age is an ambivalent factor: the greater part of the youngest group of respondents is in the middle group, and can move either way. By occupation fundamentalists are particularly well represented among small businessmen and the self-employed as well as among housewives. Fundamentalism is underrepresented among teachers, white-collar workers, skilled and unskilled workers and students. Fundamentalism is more common among respondents without any formal education than those with higher levels of education. By income it is strongest among the wealthiest - fundamentalism is not a

<sup>26</sup> 41% (lowest) - 45% - 45% - 51% - 55% (highest income stratum).

<sup>27</sup> Unspecified Christians choose the first option - a finding that is difficult to explain.

<sup>28</sup> *"Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting."*: NO - *"No matter what peoples' religious beliefs are, the only important thing is that everybody leads a responsible life and is a good human being."*: NO - *"I believe in a better life after death, where good people will be rewarded and bad people will be punished."* - *"I am convinced that my own religion is the only true one."* - *"Faith and religious values must determine all aspects of society and state."* - *"Religious leaders should stay clear of politics."*: NO - *"Women should stay out of politics"* - *"Religion is a matter between God and an individual - the country is for everybody."*: NO - *"A government which makes laws to make sure that people live according to the rules of religion."*

<sup>29</sup> Alpha = .5577.

<sup>30</sup> A respondent is listed as "not fundamentalist" if, e.g., he believes in a life after death and that his own religion is the only true one. At each successive stage convictions are added until eventually the overall picture stretches from the rejection of cultural pluralism and the separation of religion and politics up to approval of government legislation to enforce religious observance.

product of poverty. There are large differences by province: in the NWFP support for fundamentalism is twice as strong as the average, and below average everywhere else. By language group it is strongest among Pakhtoon-, followed by Hindko- and Urdu-speakers, and below average among Punjabis and Baluchis.

By religious community, the proportion of members with predominantly or completely fundamentalist attitudes is as follows:

|                        |    |
|------------------------|----|
| Deobandi               | 36 |
| Unspecified Muslims    | 20 |
| Sunnis                 | 17 |
| Barailvi               | 17 |
| Shi'as                 | 14 |
| Protestants            | 9  |
| Unspecified Christians | 9  |
| Hindus                 | 6  |
| No religion stated     | 6  |
| Catholics              | 4  |
| Parsis                 | -  |

Figures in %, rounded

As can be seen, fundamentalism is not the preserve of Islam; it is also present, albeit weakly, among Christians and Hindus. It is particularly strong among the Deobandi. Among the Sunni majority it is modestly underrepresented.

To summarise, views on the relationship between religion and politics is split. Although nine in ten respondents agree that religion is a matter between God and the individual, seven in ten also would like to see faith and religious values determine all aspects of society and state. Without putting too much of a point on it, it would appear that six in ten respondents would like a secular theocracy, as it were. Respondents split into two more or less equal groups on the questions of whether clerics should play a role in politics and whether the government should legislate observance of religious precepts: in both cases, only a narrow majority is opposed to the theocratic option. The fundamentalism scale reveals how mixed attitudes are about the relationship between religion and politics and how difficult it is to predict in which direction attitudes will tilt. One third of the respondents are basically against a theocratic state, one fifth for it and almost half in a partially secular and partially fundamentalist no-man's-land.

## Six

### Tolerance out of Insight and Conviction: Perceptions of differences and coexistence

*"Which of the following differences would you consider to be the biggest difference in Pakistan?"*

In descending order, the replies are as follows:

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Differences between rich and poor                             | 67 |
| Differences between Orthodox Muslims and other Muslims        | 20 |
| Differences between Punjabis and other regional/ethnic groups | 9  |
| Differences between Muslims and minorities                    | 4  |

Figures in %, rounded

Two thirds of all respondents consider social cleavages to be the greatest difference in Pakistan, one fifth distinctions in Muslim observances, less than one tenth distinctions between the largest and other ethnic groups and less than one twentieth distinctions between the religious majority and the minorities. Of course, people who are directly affected by cleavages see them in a different light than the majority. Fifty-four percent of the Deobandi and 35 percent of the Barailvi regard cleavages between Orthodox and other Muslims as the most important. Similarly, for 64 percent of the Hindus, 67 percent of the Protestants, 59 percent of the Catholics and 41 percent of other Christians the most serious cleavages are those between Muslims and minorities.

What do respondents think about the current state of coexistence and relations in general between the different ethnic and religious groups in their country?

*"Think of the serious problems and conflicts which have developed in our society in recent times. Which one of the following descriptions do you agree with most?"*

*I fear that peace and cooperation between groups may have become impossible*

*Or:*

*In spite of everything, peace and cooperation can still be achieved."*

Almost one quarter agree with the first statement, primarily men, middle-income respondents and Hindko-, Pashto- and Sindhi-speakers. This pessimistic view is also shared by 37 percent of the Hindus and 28 percent of the Protestants. By contrast, more than three quarters of the respondents are convinced that conflicts can be regulated peacefully. Respondents in the Punjab in particular take this view.

*"The strength of the different groups in Pakistan is so evenly balanced that it is necessary for everyone to seek compromise and find agreement."*

No less than nine in ten respondents think that compromise is necessary simply because of the current distribution of power. Agreement is above average among men, urban inhabitants and skilled and unskilled workers, and below average among Pakhtuns and respondents from the NWFP.<sup>31</sup>

*"Open conflict between groups in our society would cause everyone to lose in the long run."*

A full 96 percent agree with this statement. Agreement falls appreciably - to 83 percent - only in the NWFP: there any sign of weakness appear to be even more incompatible with local customs than elsewhere.

Apart from views about potential conflict and the balance of power, and the insights into coexistence that they motivate, there is the question of how people view cultural plurality, of perceptions of relations between different groups and of opinions on the sense of coexistence.

*"Whether one likes it or not, when groups with different languages, religions or otherwise live in one country, a group will either control others or be controlled."* 64

*"Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights."* 72

*"Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting."* 77

Figures in %, rounded

Close to two thirds of respondents believe that people must either rule or be ruled. This opinion is particularly common among women and rural inhabitants, and far less so among skilled and unskilled manual workers.<sup>32</sup>

The most interesting aspect in the reactions to the second statement is who does not think mutual acceptance and respect are possible. This view is above average among women, younger people, rural inhabitants, respondents in the upper educational and income groups and inhabitants of Islamabad and the NWFP. About half of the Protestants and the Catholics, i.e., about twice the average, also take a negative view - obviously a reflection of personal experience of disrespect and a lack of rights.

Finally, more than three quarters of all respondents agree with the statement that different groups and traditions enrich a country and make it more interesting. Who make up the one quarter that do not share this view? Once again, it is more common among women and rural inhabitants than among men and urban residents. By occupation, teachers, the liberal professions, small businessmen, students and

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<sup>31</sup> Astonishingly, only 52 percent of church employees agree, which is well below average. It is difficult to find an explanation.

<sup>32</sup> Ninety-six percent of those in church employ agree. It is not out of place to see in this attitude a rationalisation of their minority status. However, Christians as a group match the sample average.

farmers are overrepresented among the naysayers.<sup>33</sup> The NWFP is a bastion of cultural obstructionism. Remarkably, almost half the Protestants, 39 percent of the Catholics and 29 percent of the Shi'as have little time for cultural pluralism: obviously the reality of their lives makes it difficult for them to see themselves as enriching the society of the majority. It is also notable that a narrow majority of Sunnis also approve of cultural pluralism. Majorities may find this easier to accept than minorities, but it cannot be taken for granted.

There is a strong correlation between responses to eight items<sup>34</sup> concerning co-existence, which enables us to construct a scale of tolerance<sup>35</sup> with the following distribution of respondents:

|                                    |    |
|------------------------------------|----|
| Completely intolerant (0, 1 items) | 2  |
| Barely tolerant (2, 3 items)       | 15 |
| Partially tolerant (4 items)       | 20 |
| Tolerant (5, 6 items)              | 50 |
| Very tolerant (7, 8 items)         | 13 |

Figures in %, rounded

Seventeen percent are completely intolerant or barely tolerant, compared to 63 percent who are tolerant or very tolerant. Unlike on the fundamentalism scale, on the question of coexistence there is a much clearer division of opinion.

Who are the tolerant and very tolerant respondents? They are overrepresented among urban inhabitants, of whom almost three quarters take this view. They also have a presence far above average among sanitary workers, white-collar workers and skilled and unskilled manual workers. They are underrepresented among housewives, students, small businessmen, teachers, government employees and farmers. But at least in these groups half of the respondents are still tolerant or very tolerant, whereas among the liberal professions the figure drops to 43 percent.<sup>36</sup>

Tolerance rises almost linearly from 54 percent in the lowest educational stratum to 68 percent among college graduates, before dropping back to 60 percent among university graduates. By income, the degree of tolerance is highest in the middle strata and well below average at only 54 percent among the highest earners.

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<sup>33</sup> As are 75 percent of church employees. Do they dream of a country with a homogeneous Christian population?

<sup>34</sup> *"Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights."* - *"Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting."* - *"No matter what peoples' religious beliefs are, the only important thing is that everybody leads a responsible life and is a good human being."* - *"I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other."* - *"I would be quite happy if a son/daughter of mine married someone from a different language/ethnic group if they loved each other."* - *"Women should stay out of politics."* - *NO* - *"Religion is a matter between God and an individual - the country is for everybody."* - *"A government which believes that there should be no enforcement in matters of religion and which leaves religion to the believers' conscience."*

<sup>35</sup> Alpha = .4739.

<sup>36</sup> Once again, church employees are a notable exception. Among them 29 percent are completely intolerant or hardly tolerant, the largest group make up the middle category and 29 percent are tolerant or very tolerant.

There are also sharp differences between the provinces. Tolerance among the inhabitants of the Punjab and Sind is well above average at 66 and 71 percent, respectively, whereas the NWFP brings up the rear with only 40 percent. By language groups, Hindko- and Urdu-speakers are overrepresented, Punjabi-speakers modestly and Pashto- and Baluchi-speakers markedly underrepresented.

The degree of tolerance also varies considerably by religious community. Among the Muslims, the Deobandi, Shi'as and Barailvi exhibit an above-average degree, the Sunni about average and unspecified Muslims below average. Among Catholics tolerance is narrowly above average, among Protestants slightly and among unspecified Christians well below average. The highest degree of tolerance is found among respondents with no religion (74 percent), Hindus (82 percent) and Parsis (100 percent).

To summarise: social differences are the most important cleavages for a majority of respondents; those between Orthodox and other Muslims rank second. Ethnic distinctions are important only for slightly less than one tenth and those between Muslims and religious minorities only for the latter. Most respondents are convinced that no single group would be able to dominate the others and that in the event of violent conflict everybody would lose. Accordingly, most respondents believe peaceful cooperation is possible.

Almost two thirds believe that it is inevitable that one group will dominate and the others be dominated. Yet almost three quarters believe that mutual respect and recognition of one another's rights is possible and a good three quarters think that the coexistence of groups with different traditions is a social enrichment for the country. Tolerance is obviously based not only on the insight into the inevitable but also on convictions. A scale of tolerance reveals that less than one fifth of all respondents are intolerant, compared to a broad 63 percent majority of tolerant and very tolerant respondents.

## SEVEN

### Democrats and Others: Attitudes to the political order

Attitudes to the fundamentals of democratic governance - independent courts, the division of powers or checks and balances, freedom of expression, a multiparty system - are measured by a series of paired questions.

*"Here is a list of statements which describe different ways in which a society can be governed. For each pair of statements, which one could you agree with?"*

Choices in descending order of support for pro-democratic options are as follows:

|  | Democratic option |
|--|-------------------|
| <i>"Judges, who follow instructions given by the government<br/>Or:<br/>Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says."</i>   | 91                |
| <i>"A government controlled by the members of parliament elected by the people<br/>Or:<br/>A government which can act without interference by members of parliament."</i>                    | 87                |
| <i>"A government which controls what newspapers may write to prevent disunity<br/>Or:<br/>A government which allows newspapers to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression."</i> | 83                |
| <i>"One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future<br/>Or:<br/>More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future."</i>                             | 77                |

Figures in %, rounded

Nine in ten favour independent courts, a slightly small proportion control of the government by an elected parliament. More than four in five support freedom of the press and more than three in four a multiparty system. Who are the democrats and who are the others?

Independent courts are favoured in particular by students, skilled and unskilled manual workers, respondents in Baluchistan, Islamabad and the Punjab, Barailvi and Deobandi, respondents without any religion and Parsis. Judges acting under government instructions enjoy above average support among women, farmers, the liberal professions, teachers, top earners, respondents in Sind and the NWFP, Hindus and unspecified Christians.

Parliamentary control of government finds above-average approval among the highest age group, rural inhabitants, sanitary workers, students, small business-



men and white-collar workers,<sup>37</sup> better educated people and the highest income stratum, inhabitants of Islamabad, the NWFP and the Punjab, respondents without religion, Catholics, Protestants, Shi'as and unspecified Muslims. Supporters of authoritarian government are overrepresented among the lowest age group, urban inhabitants, inhabitants of Sind and Hindus.

Support for freedom of the press is strongest among the Parsis, respondents without any religion and Catholics; support among Sunnis is also slightly above average. Press controls are favoured by small businessmen, farmers and housewives, lower educational groups, inhabitants of the NWFP and the Punjab, Hindus, Deobandi and unspecified Christians.

A multiparty system finds strong approval among skilled, unskilled and white-collar workers. Support is particularly high in the NWFP and Baluchistan, among Parsis, Hindus and respondents without any religion. Who are the almost 25 per cent in favour of a one-party system? They are mainly men and rural inhabitants. More than one third of the youngest age group think this way, as do almost half the farmers and more than half the students. One third of the upper educational groups and the highest income group also favour a one-party state. By religion, above-average numbers of Catholics (46 percent), Protestants (35 percent<sup>38</sup>), unspecified Muslims (31 percent) and Barailvi (29 percent) find it attractive.

*"A government can use different methods to protect its ability to govern a country. Think of Pakistan today.*

*Which of the following methods do you approve of and which do you disapprove of?"*

The responses in descending order of approval are as follows:

|   | Approve |
|---|---------|
| Seeking political solutions by negotiation    | 98      |
| Prosecution of criminals only                 | 79      |
| Prosecution of violent political action       | 67      |
| Preventive action against political opponents | 24      |
| Introducing martial law                       | 8       |
| Censorship or banning of newspapers           | 4       |

Figures in %, rounded

Almost all approve of negotiations. More than one fifth have reservations about prosecuting criminals - reflecting the habit of previous governments of declaring political opponents to be criminals. Almost one third do not agree with the prosecution of violent political activities - a clear sign of mistrust of government motives and government definitions of political violence.

Nonetheless, just short of one quarter agree with the government taking "preventive measures" against political opponents - approximately the same proportion as those who prefer a one-party state. The social profile is similar. Almost half of

<sup>37</sup> No less than 98 percent of church employees choose the democratic option.

<sup>38</sup> But only 18 percent of church employees.

the youngest age group, more than half of the sanitary workers, farmers, self-employed and teachers, well over a third of government employees and members of the highest educational and income stratum and a good quarter of the Punjabis approve of this undemocratic step. Those who disapprove are overrepresented among unskilled, skilled and white-collar workers and inhabitants of the NWFP and Islamabad. Finally, the differences by religious affiliation are also worth noting. Almost two thirds of the Catholics, half of the Protestants,<sup>39</sup> a good third of unspecified Muslims and somewhat less than a third of the Hindus approve of taking measures against political opponents, while an above-average proportion of Sunnis, Shi'as, respondents without any religion and all Parsis disapprove.

Support of imposing martial law is particularly prevalent among the youngest age group, urban respondents, small businessmen and inhabitants of Sind, a province notorious for its lack of security.

Whereas, as seen above, 17 percent of respondents accept the rationalisation that press controls are necessary "to prevent disunity", the less euphemistic wording of "censorship or banning of newspapers" finds the approval of just four percent.

*"Many people think that important changes and improvements should happen in our country.*

*Which of the following methods would people like you feel to be a good way to bring about such changes - we do not ask for your own opinion - think of people like you who live and work around you?"*

In descending order of popularity, the replies are as follows:

|   | <i>A good thing</i> |
|---|---------------------|
| Peaceful meetings and protests          | 90                  |
| Boycotts of shops                       | 16                  |
| Stay-away strikes for 1, 2 or 3 days    | 15                  |
| Stay-away strikes for two weeks or more | 8                   |
| Violent action                          | 8                   |
| Damaging property                       | 6                   |

Figures in %, rounded

The overwhelming majority of respondents regard peaceful demonstrations as the only acceptable means of civil protest for government reform. Only 16 percent think boycotts of shops is a suitable means. Among these, sanitary workers, farmers and small businessmen are overrepresented. More than one third of Hindus, almost one third of Parsis and a good fifth of Deobandi, unspecified Muslims and Christians and respondents without religion are in favour. This is a suitable method of protest for people who do not want to attract public attention, for instance members of minorities. Those who approve of violent action include a disproportionately large number of urban inhabitants, people with a low level of education and inhabitants of Sind - a result that reflects this region's "culture of violence". Damage to property, too, is approved of by the least educated and income strata, particularly frequently by inhabitants of the NWFP and to an above-average extent by Pakhtuns.

<sup>39</sup> Church employees are an exception: 63 percent approve of persecuting opposition politicians.

*"Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle."*

More than four in five respondents agree with this statement. Those who do not are overrepresented among the youngest age group, rural inhabitants, transport and brickyard workers, sanitary workers employed in the public sector, students and farmers. Disagreement is also pronounced among respondents in the lowest and highest educational and income groups, Shi'as and unspecified Christians and Muslims. This composition indicates that the acceptance of violence is restricted to social underdogs on the one hand and high-status intellectuals who sympathise with them.

The following question seeks to measure opinions on - democratic and un-democratic - forms of governance in multi-ethnic states:

*"There are many countries like ours - that is, a country with different religious, language and ethnic groups. There are different forms of government in these countries and different opinions about what is the best way of ruling such a country. We will give you some of these opinions. Thinking of Pakistan, please tell us whether you find each one acceptable or not."*

*"Which one of these opinions is, according to your feeling, the best solution for Pakistan?"*

In descending frequency of acceptability, the answers are as follows:

|   | acceptable | best solution |
|---|------------|---------------|
| <i>"All people vote for any party they like, and the winning party (parties) rules (rule) with other parties in the opposition."</i>      | 91         | 57            |
| <i>"All people vote for any party they like but parties form a joint government which ensures a share of power for all major groups."</i> | 71         | 25            |
| <i>"A single party open to everyone rules without opposition."</i>  | 44         | 11            |
| <i>"The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided."</i>  | 23         | 4             |
| <i>"One group rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave."</i>                              | 15         | 2             |
| <i>"The country is divided up and communities form their own states."</i>   | 3          | *             |

Figures in %, rounded; \* = 0.2%

The first two solutions are democratic. The former describes classic majority democracy, the latter a system of consociational power-sharing. Majority democracy is acceptable to nine tenths of respondents and consociational democracy to seven tenths. Forty-four percent find a one-party state acceptable, far more than the 23 percent that opted for it over a multiparty state in the direct comparison above. Virtually no one is interested in partition. However, fifteen percent find the most brutal form of unilateral conflict regulation acceptable: one group rules and others have to shut up or get out. The milder form - one group decides and the

others accept - is not very democratic either, but acceptable to almost one quarter. All in all, two fifths of the respondents find undemocratic forms of government acceptable, a finding that should be a cause for concern among democrats.

Asked for the best solution, the response is much more hopeful. More than four fifths select one of the democratic systems of government. Eleven percent reveal themselves as die-hard supporters of a one-party state. Support for the extreme form of domination shrinks to just two percent.

Despite this, it is of interest to determine more closely the social profile to those who find undemocratic forms of government acceptable. The profile of those who favour a one-party state differs little from our analysis of responses to support for one- and multi-party states above, with one exception: the proportion of minorities<sup>40</sup> rises substantially. More than four in five Catholics and unspecified Christians, seven in ten Protestants and six in ten Hindus believe they could live with a one-party state, a view that may be influenced by the description of such a party as "open to everyone".<sup>41</sup>

Who makes up the 15 percent who find the absolute dominance of one group acceptable? They are overrepresented among the youngest age group, farmers, small businessmen and the liberal professions as well as students and members of the highest income group - and in particular the minorities: 52 percent of Protestants, 48 percent of unspecified Christians, 40 percent of Catholics, 21 percent of Shi'as and 18 percent of Hindus, but not one single Parsi. Can this be a reflection of the feeling that if a single group were to dominate one could not do anything about it anyway? Among the largest group, the Sunnis, only a below-average 12 percent are prepared to accept the dominance of one group.

The responses to ten statements<sup>42</sup> on the most important features of democracy, democratic forms of conflict regulation, attitudes to coexistence and the relationship between religion and state correlate closely enough to construct a scale of democracy,<sup>43</sup> on which the respondents are distributed as follows:

|                                   |    |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| Undemocratic (0-2 items)          | 2  |
| Hardly democratic (3, 4 items)    | 7  |
| Partially democratic (5, 6 items) | 21 |
| Democratic (7, 8 items)           | 34 |
| Very democratic (9, 10 items)     | 36 |

Figures in %, rounded

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<sup>40</sup> Excluding the Parsis.

<sup>41</sup> Almost all church employees, 96 percent, find an "open" one-party state of this nature acceptable.

<sup>42</sup> "Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights." - "Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting." - "The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided.": NO - "One group rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave.": NO - "A single party open to everyone rules without opposition.": NO - "More than one party, each with its own plan for the country's future." - "A government which believes that there should be no enforcement in matters of religion and which leaves religion to the believers' conscience." - "A government which allows newspapers to criticise government and enjoy freedom of expression." - "Judges, who apply the law whatever the government says." - "A government controlled by the members of parliament elected by the people."

<sup>43</sup> Alpha = .5507.

A good third of respondents are very democratic and another good third reflect democratic attitudes; less than one tenth are undemocratic. The partial democrats between them make up a good fifth of the sample.

The proportion of convinced democrats, the fourth and fifth categories combined is highest in the middle age groups.<sup>44</sup> At 15 percent, non-democrats, a combination of the first two categories, are strongly overrepresented in the youngest age group. Urban inhabitants are more democratic than people in rural areas. Democrats are overrepresented among white-collar workers, skilled and unskilled manual workers and agricultural labourers. Non-democrats are overrepresented among housewives, sanitary workers, the liberal professions, teachers, government employees and students.<sup>45</sup>

As already noted a number of times, in Pakistan there is a peculiar relationship between education and democratic attitudes. In most societies, there is a direct correlation between positive attitudes to democracy and education. This is also true of our Pakistani sample, but only up to secondary-school graduates (matric). Among respondents in tertiary education the proportion of democrats declines again.<sup>46</sup>

By income, the highest stratum has by far the lowest proportion of democrats, just 56 percent.

What is the breakdown by province?

|             |    |
|-------------|----|
| Sind        | 78 |
| Baluchistan | 73 |
| NWFP        | 68 |
| Punjab      | 66 |
| Islamabad   | 54 |

Figures in %, rounded

Sind is well and Baluchistan slightly above the average, the NWFP and the Punjab slightly below, but the capital of all places has the lowest proportion of democrats.

Once again, there are marked differences between the religious groups: democrats are overrepresented among Shi'as and Sunnis; only Parsis and the non-religious are more democratic. Democrats are underrepresented among Hindus. But the proportion falls below half among Christians: 47 percent of Protestants, 41 percent of Catholics and just 30 percent of unspecified Christians. It is even lower among church employees than among Christians in general: only 11 percent are convinced democrats, 84 percent are in the middle category of the scale. In short, there is an unmistakable democracy deficit among Christians that needs to be explained.

There is a high correlation between undemocratic attitudes and cultural antipluralism, self-categorisation as middle- or upper-class, financial satisfaction, support

<sup>44</sup> 56% (youngest) - 74% - 76% - 73% (oldest).

<sup>45</sup> Twenty percent of the students are undemocratic, 36 percent partially and only 44 percent convinced democrats.

<sup>46</sup> 62% (no formal education) - 66% - 75% - 80% - 79% - 58% (degree).

of private ownership of the means of production and a positive assessment of one's personal future - a syndrome of political authoritarianism "from above".

The responses to 14 questions or statements<sup>47</sup> allow the construction of a scale<sup>48</sup> on which the respondents are distributed as follows:

|                                     |    |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| Not authoritarian (0-2 items)       | 42 |
| Hardly authoritarian (3, 4 items)   | 27 |
| Partially authoritarian (5-7 items) | 22 |
| Authoritarian (8, 9 items)          | 7  |
| Very authoritarian (10-12 items)    | 2  |

Figures in %, rounded

This scale also reveals a hard antidemocratic core of a little below ten percent of respondents. In the youngest age group their number is double the average, among the liberal professions four times, among businessmen, teachers and students about three times. The highest educational and income groups contain three times as many authoritarian respondents as the average. They are particularly common in Islamabad. Among unspecified Muslims authoritarian respondents are twice as common as on average, while authoritarianism is well below average among Sunnis. Once again, the proportion of anti-democrats is very high among the Christian minority,<sup>49</sup> whereas there is not one authoritarian Hindu or Parsi.

In summary, four fifths of the respondents favour independent courts, the division of powers, controls on government power and freedom of the press. Three quarters support a multiparty system. Just as respondents are sceptical about any government measure beyond negotiations as a way of entrenching their power, so they also express reservations about every radical form of opposition beyond peaceful protests. Three quarters regard either majority or consociational democracy as the most appropriate way of regulating the problems of a multi-ethnic state. The democracy scale confirms the individual findings: nine percent are undemocratic and 21 percent are partially democratic, compared to 70 percent who are strong or very strong democrats.

Democratic deficits are identifiable, both in content and social structure. The greatest temptation is the one-party state, which 44 percent find acceptable, 23

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<sup>47</sup> *"Even very different groups living in one country can easily accept each other as they are and respect each other's mutual rights.": NO - "Groups with different traditions make a country socially richer and more interesting.": NO - "Violence and killing can never be justified, no matter how important the struggle.": NO - "I would not mind if a child of mine married someone from a different religion provided they love each other.": - "When I see what the rich have I feel that I should have the same.": - "The largest group rules, and the other groups accept what is decided." - "One group rules over the others, and people that refuse to accept this have to keep quiet or leave." - "A single party open to everyone rules without opposition." - "One political party only, with a single plan for the country's future." - "Shops and factories owned by private businessmen who will work hard to make the businesses grow." - "A government which allows people who are clever and work hard to become wealthier than others, even if some remain permanently poor." - Self- definition as upper class, upper middle class, or middle class - "As regards your money situation, are you better or worse off today than five years ago?": BETTER - "How do you think you will feel in ten years time?": VERY HAPPY, HAPPY.*

<sup>48</sup> Alpha = .6908.

<sup>49</sup> Thirty-nine percent of Protestants, 34 percent of unspecified Christians and 33 percent of Catholics.

percent prefer to a multiparty system and 12 percent think is the best solution. The socio-structural centres of antidemocratic attitudes are the highest educational and income groups. An above-average proportion of government employees, teachers and students are not reliable democrats; it is not too far-fetched to speak of *trahison des clercs* - betrayal of democracy by the intellectuals. Another finding that portends trouble in the future is the below-average proportion of democrats among the youngest of all age groups. The specific democratic deficit of the Christian minority, by contrast, is hardly a threat to democracy in Pakistan because of the group's democratic unimportance. It is primarily a problem of the Christian community.

Be that as it may, whether Pakistan is a complete democracy today is a moot point. What is certain, however, is that it is not a case of a democracy without democrats. If anything, it is a case of democrats without stable democracy.

## EIGHT

### Three Political Subcultures: Differences in political perceptions, aspirations and orientations

People's political perceptions of their own country are often influenced by their ideas of an ideal country with which they compare their own.

*"In your mind which country comes closest to being an ideal country, the country which other countries should attempt to be like?"*

The responses in descending order are as follows:

|                        |    |
|------------------------|----|
| Saudi Arabia           | 26 |
| Pakistan               | 24 |
| Japan                  | 14 |
| China                  | 8  |
| USA                    | 8  |
| Iran                   | 5  |
| Arab/Islamic countries | 4  |
| Western democracies    | 3  |
| Other Asian countries  | 3  |
| UK                     | 2  |
| None                   | 3  |

Figures in %, rounded

A good quarter choose Saudi Arabia, a country in which many Pakistanis have found employment as foreign workers and the financial means to improve the living conditions of their families. Almost one quarter think their own country is ideal. Japan, a modern Asian country, follows in third place. The USA is not overly popular - in the meantime it has probably become considerably less so. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are mentioned more frequently by women, Japan and China by men and urban inhabitants.

Admirers of Pakistan are overrepresented among government officials, students, housewives and sanitary workers, while Japan and China are mentioned particularly often by skilled manual workers.<sup>50</sup> The choice of Saudi Arabia correlates inversely with education and income; it is a particular favourite of the Barailvi and Deobandi. Democratic western countries are favoured to an above-average extent by Parsis, Christians and Hindus.

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<sup>50</sup> Two in five church employees choose Japan.



How do respondents rate foreign influence in Pakistan?

*"There are a number of foreign governments and organizations which have tried to influence Pakistan. For each country we mention, please tell us whether you consider its influence as helpful or as harmful."*

The responses in descending order of helpfulness are as follows:

|                 | Helpful |
|-----------------|---------|
| Saudi Arabia    | 87      |
| Iran            | 73      |
| Japan           | 67      |
| UN              | 55      |
| World Bank      | 48      |
| UK              | 38      |
| USA             | 27      |
| Afghan refugees | 15      |
| India           | 5       |

Figures in %, rounded

Admiration of a country is one thing, its assessment as helpful or harmful for one's own country another. Among Pakistan's regional neighbours, the influence of Saudi Arabia and Iran is held to be generally positive and that of India negative. Opinions about the United Nations and the World Bank divide more or less down the middle. The USA and the UK are viewed as generally harmful. The influence of Afghan refugees, a heavy economic burden for Pakistan, is regarded as very harmful.

These assessments reveal a high degree of realism. Realism also dominates perceptions of the problems and power structures in Pakistan.

The responses to an open question about Pakistan's most pressing problems are as follows:

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Economy, inflation, poverty, social injustice | 57 |
| "Politics"                                    | 11 |
| Ethnic, regional or religious conflicts       | 7  |
| Education                                     | 6  |
| Internal security                             | 5  |
| Other   | 14 |

Figures in %, rounded

Social and economic concerns rank well ahead of everything else; "politics", i.e., political instability, comes second. In the first choice, men mention above all unemployment and women rising prices. Economic problems correlate inversely and political problems directly with income. Minorities in particular - Shi'as, Hindus, Parsis and Christians, but also Deobandi - see group conflicts as a serious problem.

The following question explored perceptions of the structures of power and influence in Pakistan:

*"Which of the following influential groups of people do you consider as very important, or as not important in Pakistan?"*

The following groups were named in descending order of importance:

|                               | Very important |
|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Government members            | 91             |
| Leaders of political parties  | 90             |
| Big industrialists            | 78             |
| Trade union leaders           | 78             |
| Bankers                       | 77             |
| Military leaders              | 74             |
| Big merchants                 | 73             |
| Head of religious communities | 68             |
| Big landowners                | 56             |

Figures in %, rounded

Trade union leaders are mentioned particularly often by skilled workers, and military leaders and big industrialists by members of minorities. Businessmen tend to regard bankers as influential. Rural inhabitants, the youngest age group, Baluchis and Pakhtuns favour religious leaders, whose influence is also rated as particularly high by Shi'as, Deobandi and Christians.<sup>51</sup> People who regard big landowners as important are more likely than average to be farmers or agricultural labourers living in Sind or Baluchistan; Hindus and Christians are heavily overrepresented. Specific evaluations can be largely explained by respondents' circumstances.

Respondents' realism is also apparent in their reactions to assessments of the influence of their politicians of choice and their willingness to support them:

*"Thinking of political leaders whom you admire, would you agree or disagree with the following statements?"*

The replies in descending order of agreement are as follows:

|  | agree |
|--|-------|
| <i>"There is not much my political leaders can do to improve our lives."</i>                                   | 71    |
| <i>"Given the situation in the country these leaders cannot be very efficient in promoting our interests."</i> | 63    |
| <i>"Even if my leader acts in a way which I disagree with, I would still support him/her in an election."</i>  | 38    |
| <i>"Even if my leader acts in a way I do not understand, I would still support him/her."</i>                   | 28    |

Figures in %, rounded

<sup>51</sup> Well above average by church employees.

The results reflect a high degree of scepticism. Two thirds of the respondents do not believe that their politicians can do much for them. Despite this, a good third remains loyal at election time, even if they hold different opinions. But only a good quarter is prepared to show unconditional support for their political leaders.

What kind of policies would respondents prefer? We have already seen above that 86 percent favoured more equitable policies, even if this meant higher taxes.

*"What kind of government would you prefer?"*

|  | agree |
|--|-------|
| <i>"A government which is honest, with no bribery or stealing</i>  | 86    |
| <i>Or:<br/>A government with some men who might be a little dishonest but who are strong and inspiring leaders."</i>               |       |
| <i>"A government which allows people in provinces and towns to elect councils to make many of their own laws</i>                   |       |
| <i>Or:<br/>A government which makes laws which are the same for all areas of the whole country."</i>                               | 75    |
| <i>Shops and factories owned by private businessmen who will work hard to make the businesses grow</i>                             | 57    |
| <i>Or:<br/>Shops and factories owned by a government elected by the people."</i>   |       |
| <i>"A government which allows one national language only (except at home)</i>  | 52    |
| <i>Or:<br/>A government which gives everybody the right to use his own language in public, in offices, courts and Parliament."</i> |       |

Figures in %, rounded

There is a very strong desire for clean government. This is expressed particularly often among respondents of the highest educational stratum and members of minorities, i.e., groups who are favourite targets of dirty methods. Only one quarter of respondents support political decentralisation or federalism; although well over a third of the inhabitants of Sind, Baluchistan and the capital support it, a full three quarters of respondents want the same laws for the whole country.

Opinions are sharply divided on the question of whether shops or factories should be in private or public ownership. There is a majority for private ownership of commercial and manufacturing enterprises, but a substantial minority of 43 per cent would prefer to see them nationalized. Support for state control is above average among skilled and unskilled manual workers, white-collar workers and middle-income groups. There is above-average support for private ownership among farmers, businessmen, government employees, the liberal professions, students and teachers. Supporters of private ownership are overrepresented among inhabitants of Islamabad, Baluchistan and Sind; it is least popular in the NWFP. A large majority of all minorities favour private ownership; among them Deobandi and

Barailvi have the greatest proportion in favour of public ownership. Sunnis reflect exactly the average of all respondents.

Opinions are even more closely divided on the question of language. A narrow majority is in favour of just one official language. This view is particularly strong among those that would benefit, viz. those whose mother tongue is Urdu. By contrast, the great majority of Baluchi- Pashto- and Sindhi-speakers favour language pluralism. The same is true of respondents in the lowest educational and income groups.

Because of the role played by strong women in Pakistani politics, the desirability of this is a perennial question. However, more than two thirds reject the statement that

*"Women should stay out of politics."*

Who are the 31 percent of respondents who agree? They are overrepresented among women, rural inhabitants, older people, those without any formal education, Baluchis, Pakhtuns and Hindko-speakers. Rejection is strongest in Islamabad and the Punjab.

Another contentious question is how to award jobs to people. Responses to the following question throw some light on this:

*"When choosing people for jobs in the PRIVATE SECTOR / in the ARMY / in the GOVERNMENT SECTOR / in the CABINET OF THE COUNTRY, who should be chosen?"*

- anyone who is qualified
- mainly people from my group
- each group should have people according to their numbers of the population
- each group should have its own institutions."

The replies are distributed as follows:

|                       | Private sector | Public sector | Army | Cabinet |
|-----------------------|----------------|---------------|------|---------|
| On merit              | 84             | 82            | 82   | 82      |
| Proportionally        | 12             | 14            | 15   | 13      |
| Own group             | 3              | 4             | 3    | 5       |
| Separate institutions | *              | *             | *    | *       |

Figures in %, rounded; \* = below 1%

The pattern is similar for all spheres. More than four in five respondents are in favour of choosing people on their qualifications. Practically nobody wants separate institutions. Support for proportional distribution of jobs in the public sector finds above-average support in the NWFP and Sind, as does support for proportionality in the government. Respondents in the NWFP and Baluchistan express above-average support for the option of "mainly people from my group" in respect of the army and the government.

As described above, political perceptions and social and political preferences vary by social structure. Is this also the case for party political preferences? A discussion of the development of Pakistan's party system goes beyond the scope of

this study. Since its creation, Pakistan has always had a large number of political parties. The oldest is the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which has been through a number of splits and reunifications. Despite this, it has always been one of the large popular parties. Since the 1970s, it has been rivalled by another large popular party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Both have held power a number of times. In the 1990s many observers predicted with some confidence the development of a stable party system, in which the PML as conservative and the PPP as progressive party would alternate in government. These political commentators overlooked the fact that among the many smaller parties there were a number with similar programmes that drew their inspiration from political Islam. In the last elections these parties formed an electoral alliance for the first time and immediately became the third strongest political force in the country. Whether this portends a three-party system remains to be seen.

In our sample, seven in ten respondents expressed a preference for the PML, PPP or one of the Islamist parties, while two in ten said they did not have a preference for any party or liked none of them. The number of those adherents of each of the three major political trends is large enough to compare their social composition, their attitudes to religion and politics and their democratic credentials. We start with differences in terms of socio-structural characteristics.

Supporters of the PPP are overrepresented among skilled and unskilled manual workers, white-collar employees and teachers. Support for the PPP is also above average among sanitary workers. They are particularly numerous among respondents in the middle educational groups and the two lowest income groups. Geographically, its support has a normal distribution; among Sindhi- and Saraiki-speakers they are overrepresented. PPP support among the Sunnis is average, and above average among Shi'as, Barailvi, Christians, Hindus and respondents without any religion.

The PML draws above average support from the liberal professions, people in private services, government employees and students. It is overrepresented among the highest educational and income groups, but also has above-average support in the second lowest educational group. Its regional stronghold is the Punjab. Support is above average among Sunnis.

Support for the Islamist parties is well above average among housewives and people in the private services and well below among government employees. By education, they attract the two lowest and the second highest (college) in particular. By income, their support is strongest in the lowest stratum. Their regional stronghold is the NWFP. In Baluchistan and Sind support is above average, but in the Punjab well below. By religious community, they do best among the Deobandi.

One third each of the supporters of the PPP and the PML can imagine voting for the other party. Forty-five percent of those that support one Islamist party would vote for another Islamist party; another 32 percent also view the PML as an alternative.

There are marked differences by choice of ideal country. PPP supporters choose Japan and western democracies particularly often, supporters of the PML Pakistan and the USA, and those of the Islamist parties Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The various scales we constructed above illuminate the clear differences between the three political trends.

| Scale of job satisfaction | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Very satisfied            | 11        | <b>14</b> | 8                | 12 |
| Satisfied                 | <b>13</b> | 10        | <b>15</b>        | 12 |
| In the middle             | 25        | <b>30</b> | <b>32</b>        | 27 |
| Dissatisfied              | <b>29</b> | 28        | 24               | 28 |
| Very dissatisfied         | <b>22</b> | 19        | 20               | 21 |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

To oversimplify: the dissatisfied are particularly attracted to the PPP, the very satisfied to the PML and the moderately satisfied to the Islamist parties.

How do the three trends differ by religiosity?

| Scale of religiosity | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Not religious        | 1         | 1         | -                | 1  |
| Hardly religious     | <b>2</b>  | -         | -                | 1  |
| Somewhat religious   | <b>9</b>  | 5         | 4                | 7  |
| Religious            | <b>21</b> | 13        | 15               | 18 |
| Very religious       | 67        | <b>80</b> | <b>81</b>        | 73 |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

The PPP is hardly a party of the ungodly: two thirds of its supporters are very religious. But a larger proportion of its supporters are also found in the moderate categories than the other two trends. The proportion of very religious among PML supporters is virtually as high as that of the Islamist parties.

There are greater differences between the three trends regarding fundamentalism:

| Scale of fundamentalism      | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Not fundamentalist           | <b>6</b>  | 2         | 1                | 4  |
| Hardly fundamentalist        | <b>39</b> | 17        | 6                | 29 |
| Partially fundamentalist     | 48        | <b>54</b> | 41               | 49 |
| Predominantly fundamentalist | 7         | <b>26</b> | <b>38</b>        | 16 |
| Completely fundamentalist    | -         | 2         | <b>14</b>        | 2  |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

Above average is the proportion of PPP adherents that is not or hardly fundamentalist and the proportion of PML supporters that is partially or predominantly fundamentalist; the proportion of Islamist supporters that is predominantly or completely fundamentalist is well above average. At the risk of exaggerating: PPP supporters do not want a theocratic state, those of the Islamist parties do, and those of the PML appear to be on the way to one.

Differences between the three trends are even sharper in terms of tolerance:

| Scale of tolerance    | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Completely intolerant | -         | 2         | <b>10</b>        | 2  |
| Barely tolerant       | 10        | <b>21</b> | <b>34</b>        | 16 |
| Partially tolerant    | 14        | <b>25</b> | <b>27</b>        | 19 |
| Tolerant              | <b>59</b> | 44        | 27               | 51 |
| Very tolerant         | <b>17</b> | 8         | 2                | 13 |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

PPP supporters are mostly tolerant or very tolerant, those of the PML barely or partially tolerant and above average proportions of those of the Islamist parties completely intolerant, intolerant and partially tolerant.

How do the three political trends compare in terms of democracy?

| Scale of democracy   | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Undemocratic         | 1         | <b>3</b>  | 1                | 2  |
| Hardly democratic    | 6         | <b>12</b> | <b>16</b>        | 9  |
| Partially democratic | 19        | <b>29</b> | <b>34</b>        | 23 |
| Democratic           | 33        | 32        | 33               | 33 |
| Very democratic      | <b>41</b> | 24        | 17               | 33 |

Figures in %, rounded; bold figures indicate above average values

Seventy-four percent of PPP supporters are democratic and very democratic, as are 56 percent of PML supporters and half of the supporters of Islamist parties. However, the PPP is unequivocally the political home of strong democratic convictions, while undemocratic, hardly democratic and partially democratic views have a political home in the Islamist parties, but also in the PML.

Finally, a very interesting comparison between the three main political trends is the extent to which they reflect the specific combination of attitudes - anti-democratic, antipluralistic and economically satisfied - that we labelled "political authoritarianism":

| Scale of political authoritarianism | PPP       | PML       | Islamist parties | ∅  |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------|----|
| Not authoritarian                   | <b>42</b> | 31        | 33               | 38 |
| Hardly authoritarian                | <b>29</b> | 25        | 23               | 27 |
| Partially authoritarian             | 21        | 25        | <b>34</b>        | 24 |
| Authoritarian                       | 6         | <b>13</b> | <b>9</b>         | 8  |
| Very authoritarian                  | 2         | <b>6</b>  | 1                | 3  |

Figures in %, rounded

This combination is reflected to an average degree among supporters of the Islamist parties, hardly at all among those of the PPP, and very strongly among those of the PML.

To summarise: the world view of the Pakistanis is manageable. Saudi Arabia, Japan and their own country are seen as ideal states and the neighbouring states

with the exception of India as friendly and helpful. For a majority the most important problems are economic: unemployment and inflation. Members of the government and party leaders are held to be important but at the same time not very effective.

People's main wish is for clean government. A narrow majority is in favour of a market economy; the others would prefer to see shops and factories run by the state. Three quarters of all respondents want a state in which the same laws apply to everybody, but only half want one official language. Two thirds have nothing against the role of women in politics. Four fifths believe that jobs and positions in Pakistan should be awarded on merit.

The supporters of the three major political trends differ so sharply in terms of social structure, attitudes and opinions that one may speak of three separate political subcultures. The PPP draws its support primarily from the middle and lower classes; among the Sunni majority it enjoys average and among most of the minorities above-average support. The PML is the preferred party of the middle and upper strata. Its support is above average among Sunnis and in the Punjab. Supporters of the Islamist parties are overrepresented at the lower and the upper ends of the social ladder, and in particular in the NWFP.

Supporters of the PPP are largely dissatisfied with their economic and job situation, while those of the PML tend to be satisfied and those of the Islamist parties are in the middle. Large majorities of the supporters of all parties are pious. But whereas the PPP is the party of the moderately religious, the very religious among the respondents tend to be overrepresented in the other two parties. There are virtually no fundamentalists among the supporters of the PPP, a fair number among the supporters of the PML and a lot among the supporters of the Islamist parties. The distribution of tolerance is the reverse: tolerance is most prevalent among PPP supporters, whereas intolerance is most widespread in the Islamist parties and to a somewhat lesser degree in the PML. The situation is similar in respect of democracy: most convinced democrats are in the PPP and far fewer in the other two political trends. Political authoritarianism is strongest among the adherents of the PML, somewhat less pronounced in the Islamist parties, and seldom among supporters of the PPP. In short: the three political subcultures differ fundamentally in their views of the social and political order.



### III

## Thoughts about the Scope for Action and Possible Options for Pakistani Christians

When different groups live together in a society, they cannot live only according to their wishes but must accept certain constraints on their activities.

It is relatively easy for groups who form a large majority in a society to shape that society according to their wishes. They can afford to adopt a policy of complete pluralism without fearing the loss of their own identity. They can also choose to open up and offer minorities the opportunity to assimilate, to allow them to buy equality at the price of their identity, so to speak. Finally, the majority also have the option of unilaterally putting their stamp on society, its way of life and its symbols and of marginalising minorities.

Large minorities are in a position to resist both assimilation and marginalisation. They can mobilise their not inconsiderable resources and organise themselves politically to win for themselves a place in society commensurate with their strength. However, such action is not without its dangers, as so many civil wars testify. Any miscalculation, in particular overestimating one's own strength, carries the risk of disaster. To avoid this, it is advisable to adjust demands to what is achievable without open conflict.

Very small minorities have the fewest options, as their scope for action is limited by the options of the majority. If the latter opts for a policy of assimilation, the minority has to decide whether it is prepared to pay the price. If the majority opts to marginalize other groups, a small minority has little choice but to organize its life as meaningfully as possible at the edge of society and to try to ensure as far as it can that it has the help of those parts of the majority that openly support pluralism.

Pakistan's Muslim majority openly offers minorities assimilation: converts to Islam are acceptable and desirable. Why do so few Christians take advantage of this offer? Before answering this question it is advisable to take a brief look at the history and the social composition of the Christian community in Pakistan.

## ONE

### A Church of Untouchables

The Nestorians arrived in the Punjab in the eighth century and the Jesuits at the end of the sixteenth. Both have vanished without trace. The contemporary history of Christianity in the territory of modern-day Pakistan begins in the middle of the nineteenth century with the arrival of British army chaplains and of migrants from Goa, one of the older Christian communities in Asia.

The Goans came to fill the new jobs and business opportunities that opened up under the security of British rule. Migrants from the lower castes in Goa worked as skilled labourers, craftsmen, tailors and cooks, those from Goa's middle and upper classes became teachers, civil servants, merchants or bankers. In Karachi in particular they formed an upwardly mobile economic group. They also provided the first local clergy. For Goans the question of why they did not become Muslims never arose. Their response to growing Islamisation is emigration. Today there are more Goans from Pakistan in Canada, Australia and the United States than in their former stronghold of Karachi.

The army chaplains looked after the British soldiers and their children in and out of wedlock. Although British troops were stationed in India for decades, few married Hindu women. Illegitimate children were housed in specially created orphanages. Mixed marriages and orphanages produced a small group of Anglo-Indians.<sup>52</sup> Members of this group do not convert to Islam because most of them find the combination of European and Indian cultures in which they grow up more attractive than the attempt to become part of the Muslim majority. If the majority puts too much pressure on them, they, too, have usually opted for emigration.

The founders of the Christian Church in present-day Pakistan were not army chaplains but missionaries. They arrived around the middle of the nineteenth century, after the British parliament ruled that the British East India Company had to allow missionaries to work in the areas under its control. Protestant churches sent American and Scottish Presbyterians, American Methodists and English Anglicans; Catholic missionaries included German Jesuits, Dutch Franciscans, English and Dutch Mill Hill Fathers, Italian Dominicans and Belgian Capuchins. The first missionaries pursued a "mission from above", attempting to convert educated individuals and upper-caste Hindus as well as Muslims to Christianity. However, individual conversions were few and far between and seldom brought happiness. Converts, mostly young men, were rejected by their families and usually could find work only with the missions. Only in very few cases were they able to convince their

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<sup>52</sup> There are different strata of Anglo-Indians. Those who were descendants of English members of the British Army - with established paternity - were mostly treated as Protestants; some of them reached leadership status in the military. Children of Irish Catholic soldiers and their descendants, often referred to as Railway and Police Anglo-Indians, are perceived as of a lower social rank.

families to follow their example. After half a century of missionary work, Christians were still a very small flock.

That changed virtually overnight around 1880 with the first mass conversions of untouchables, members of those classes in Indian society that the British colonial authorities designated the scheduled castes. The largest group of these - about one million people according to the 1881 census - were the Chudra. Chudra

"are consigned by tradition to 'unclean' jobs - paradoxically, that means jobs that ensure cleanliness. They make brooms, rubbish baskets and cereal baskets. They clean public areas, clear out places reserved for human waste, and gather cow dung to make round bricks which, when dried, are used as fuel. They also wash corpses and perform various tasks connected with funerals. In short, they do 'impure' work in terms of a traditional schema inspired by Hinduism. The name Chudra is no longer used. They are sometimes called *mehtar*, 'sweeper', a name which describes their profession; more often, they are given the simple title kammi, or artisan. There are several names for this community, according to the places where they are settled. ...they are called Musalli or Dindar - names which reflect their conversion to Islam - and Massih if they are Christians."<sup>53</sup>

Chudra or sweepers' (and members of other occupations of low social standing, such as the Meg, a caste of weavers) almost queued up to join the churches. Families, extended families and clans changed their religion together. New converts worked as lay preachers to persuade other members of their group. Because of the sheer numbers, missionaries were at times hard-pressed to ensure that the new Christians received adequate preparation in their new religion. The Presbyterians were the first to shift the focus of their work from urban to rural areas, where they founded schools. Other missionary societies followed their example. Mass conversions continued for about another 50 years. After the partition of India there was one last surge, when members of groups regarded as inferior decided that in the new state of Pakistan they would prefer to live not as Hindus or Sikhs, but as Christians.

The great majority of Christians in Pakistan are descendants of members of classes that, according to the caste concepts of Hindu society, are considered inferior and untouchable. Why did they become Christians rather than Muslims? If their main motivation was to escape discrimination, why did, and do, they not choose the other great monotheistic religion that also preaches that all men are equal before God? Muslim society, in contrast to Hindu society, may no longer justify social stratification on religious grounds, but much of its behaviour is still strictly endogamous. In families and clans sons follow the occupation of their father. In doing so, they also adopt parental attitudes about social prestige and social hierarchy, including prejudices against groups of lower social standing. An untouchable who has converted to Islam remains a musalli; the new Muslims are still treated as socially inferior. Christian egalitarianism did not really fare better. It has been put to the test in the one Christian society only that pre-dated the mass conversion of outcasts, viz. Goanese, and the result was nothing to write home about. Yet, Christian converts from Hinduism, most of whom lived in the Punjab, had only limited contact with Goans.

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<sup>53</sup> Pierre Lafrance, "Between Caste and Tribe," in: Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, London: Anthem Press, 2002, p. 210

The most plausible reason why untouchables turned to Christianity is doubtless the fact that the Christian churches look after their faithful. Protestants and Catholics competed in their efforts not only to bring the faith to their adherents, but also to promote their material well-being. Today, the two confessions have about equal numbers. Catholics are the largest single Christian group, whereas Protestants are divided between the Church of Pakistan (formed in 1970 by the union of Methodists, Anglicans, Scottish Presbyterians and Lutherans), the United Presbyterians, Pentecostals and a number of smaller Protestant denominations. In recent years, evangelical organisations have also been taking an interest in low-caste Hindus. All of them are looking for ways to help their faithful to escape from discrimination and inferiority.

## Two

### Education and Settlements: Ways out of inferiority

In a country in which only a minority of children attend school, the opportunity to do so is a privilege - a privilege for members of despised groups in particular. Even primary school education confers a status that can compensate for the status denied by birth. This may not have been the main motivation of the first school founders among the missionaries. But this does not detract from the result. A detailed statistical breakdown goes beyond the scope of this study; suffice to say that at the end of the 1960s places were available in Christian schools for a substantial proportion of Christian children.

Bhutto's policy of nationalising private schools in Sindh and Punjab, in 1972, though not aimed primarily at Christians, affected them very badly. Decades of work and effort were wiped out at a stroke. In theory, the number of places for Christian schoolchildren in state schools was proportionate to the Christian share of population. In practice, this meant that there were places in thousands of village schools for Christian children, but no Christians. And where there are Christians - they usually live in compact settlements - they were entitled to only two percent of the school places. The churches went back to square one. As long as private school were prohibited, they organised bible classes where other subjects were also taught. Zia-ul-Haq lifted the ban on private schools. Nationalised school buildings were supposed to be returned, but because of the awkward attitude of government officials, above all in the Punjab, the return of school buildings has still not been completed. Since the end of the 1980s, Misereor has supported the reconstruction of a Catholic school system.

Remarkably for a government that called itself socialist, the 1972 nationalisation applied only to schools that charged no or low school fees. "Paying" schools, of which both the Catholic and Protestant Churches had a considerable number, were not affected. The names of the most prestigious schools in the country reads like the litany of all saints. The first of them were founded for children of the British officers. After independence, they were followed by children of the Pakistani upper class, who had no difficulty paying the high school fees. In other words, the school congregations devoted themselves for the most part to the education of a future Muslim bourgeoisie. Most Christians did not have the money and their children did not have the educational background to successfully compete at these schools.

This can be regarded as a social scandal. However, there is also a more discriminating view. Elite schools, too, are a way, if a little winding, out of inferiority. The Muslim graduates of these schools get to know - and respect - an intellectual dimension of Christianity that would otherwise have remained hidden from them. When President Musharraf shows some openness for the concerns of Christians, this may be at least partly owing to the years he spent at St. Anthony's, a Catholic elite school in Karachi. Incidentally, the revenue surpluses of these schools are frequently used to subsidise Christian primary schools that cannot cover their

costs. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion of Christian pupils has been rising. Particularly gifted applicants receive scholarships and now there are even a few families that can pay their own way.

Schools were not the only route missionaries opened; settlements were the other. The opportunity for this came when the British administration built a comprehensive system of canals in the Punjab in the second half of the nineteenth century with the intention of promoting the cultivation of cotton. At the same time they granted concessions for new villages along the canals. These concessions were distributed in accordance with caste privileges: higher-ranking castes got plots of land at the beginning of the flow and others only lower down - and that is where the Christian villages are found.

Despite this, these villages offered a high measure of security, and Christian farmers got a chance to be farmers like everybody else. The settlement movement started by the missionaries was continued by local Christians. The results are impressive: there are 47 villages inhabited exclusively by Christians, most of them in the Punjab; of these, 17 were founded after independence.

The settlement movement has often been criticised. Some European visitors describe them as a bizarre attempt at ghetto-building. This assessment does not hold on closer examination. It is based on the questionable analogy: if French or German Catholics withdraw from a secular or liberal environment into an allegorical "ghetto", this has little in common with the harsh reality of the real ghettos of religious minorities. People enter allegorical ghettos voluntarily because they disagree with their social environment for whatever reasons. The creation of real ghettos on the other hand is usually the result of compulsion on the part of a hostile majority that could not tolerate members of minorities in their vicinity. Jews in Europe and Christians and Jews in the Arab world were forced to live in ghettos, which they left whenever the majority permitted a degree of physical coexistence and discrimination declined. At the same time as European Catholics voluntarily withdrew into their allegorical ghetto, Jews and Christians in the Orient were leaving their real ghettos as they gained equality in civil law, advanced economically and were increasingly accepted by the majority.

For Pakistani Christians life in a new settlement enabled them to escape from an existence on the edge of Muslim villages, literally and figuratively from the knacker's yard, and to farm their own land. Becoming a settler in a Christian village meant working for oneself instead of for others, meant holding one's head high instead of bowing and scraping all life long. The success of these villages speaks for itself. They are moderately prosperous, even though they face growing economic difficulties, like the entire agricultural sector in Pakistan. As a rule, the inhabitants of neighbouring Muslim villages respect the Christian settler farmers; by status and standard of living they are on the same level. The self-confident Christians one meets in Pakistani cities come from families in such villages. In the Near East one can observe a similar phenomenon. In unequal societies, members of minorities are most likely to gain self-respect and self-confidence if at least in their most immediate territory they are not constantly reminded that society as a whole regards them as inferior.

## THREE

### From Outcasts to Scapegoats? On Muslim misperceptions of Pakistani Christians

When groups set off on a journey, they soon begin to spread out: some wanderers are faster than others. For a substantial part of Pakistan's Christians the journey has not been only figurative but also literal. Their villages cannot support a growing population by farming alone. For some time now people have been migrating to cities. Today, by religious affiliation, Christians are second only to the Parsis in their degree of urbanisation. Almost one in two Christians is urbanised.

A number have journeyed far further. During the oil boom the Gulf States sought migrants for various jobs - paid poorly by the standards of the host country, but very well compared to the potential earnings back home. The migrants were frugal in the extreme and returned home with what amounted to a small fortune.

Today, the Christians' social spectrum is strongly diversified, as the survey data show. A large proportion is still illiterate and many are still agricultural labourers, brickyard workers and sanitary workers. In these occupations people are still forced to live in conditions "that resemble slavery", to quote the 2002 *International Religious Freedom Report* of the US State Department. These Christians are among the poorest of the poor in Pakistan. Those who work in town or cities live for the most part in bastis, poor residential districts on the periphery - not allegorical, but literal ghettos. The Christian middle class also tends to settle in the vicinity of other Christians. This middle class has grown rapidly, and now consists of teachers, nurses, white-collar workers, policemen and middle-ranking railway officials, but also small businessmen and members of the liberal professions.

Admittedly, perceptions of the Christian minority in the Muslim majority have not kept up with this social differentiation. Middle-class Christians are a tiny minority in the middle class of Pakistani society as a whole, and are not conspicuous. Statistically speaking, a Muslim is far more likely to know a Christian sanitary worker than any other Christian. What we have here is the reverse of Bertolt Brecht's succinct formulation on the perception of class differences: one sees only those in the dark, and oversees those in the light.

On account of this misperception, the majority continues to look down on the minority, a problem that complicates the advance of individual Christians.

This makes another, fairly recent misperception all the more paradoxical, viz. that Christians are local representatives of the West, a view held above all by violent Islamist extremists. Of all communities, they choose to identify one that is weak and generally held to be even weaker than it really is with the rich, powerful and hated West and attack it as its proxy. The Blasphemy Act is dangerous not only because its imprecise formulation opens the door wide to unjustified charges, but in particular because of the pressure that Islamists regularly bring to bear on boards

of inquiry and judges. Although convictions under this law are extremely rare - most defendants are found innocent on appeal - many defendants are killed in custody, and even those found not guilty have to hide or leave the country because their life is no longer safe.

Since the second half of the 1990s, Christians have been faced with far more immediate threats than simply dubious jurisprudence. Churches have been destroyed, and Christian residential areas and villages attacked. Terrorist attacks on worshippers and also on individuals have claimed a number of lives. The terrorist organisations are powerful; even the state president has narrowly survived two assassination attempts. Christians, however, are "soft targets". They are the perfect scapegoats.

The misperception of a minority of the majority is more dangerous than that of the whole majority. But it is also easier to combat as the state, for reasons of self-respect and its own survival, also has an interest in combating it.

Therefore, the Christians' prime interest is in correcting those perceptions that can obstruct their long-term development. The search for ways out of inferiority continues.



## FOUR

### Looking for Allies

Small minorities often follow the recommendation: "If you cannot beat them, join them". But if they are not prepared to assimilate and lose their identity, the best form of compliance is to search for allies in the majority, and particularly for allies that - for their own interest rather than out of sympathy for the minority - hold normative ideas of the majority culture that, as a by-product so to speak, grant the minorities a maximum degree of equality.

In ethnically pluralist states nationalists in particular tend to treat the interests of the state as a whole as more important than those of the individual ethnic groups. They tend to be the best allies for ethnic minorities. In the case of religiously pluralist states, the views of the secularists have the greatest attraction for small religious minorities: the smaller the role (the majority) religion plays in the state, the better things are for religious minorities. Accordingly, Protestants in the Latin countries of Europe, Jews everywhere (except in Israel) and Christians in the Arab world (except in Lebanon) are the most enthusiastic supporters of the greatest possible degree of secularism.

As the empirical survey has revealed, a considerable proportion of Pakistan's Muslim majority wants to keep religion and politics as separate as possible. They reject fundamentalist positions because they themselves feel threatened by them. Such attitudes are most common among supporters of the PPP, but they also reach deep into the ranks of the various Muslim Leagues. Hence it is only logical that the PPP draws the support of most Pakistani Christians.

Initiatives and organisations that object to others taking decisions for them, and hence also object to them taking decisions for others, are the groups which offer the greatest support to minorities: women's organizations, human rights groups, liberal lawyers, workers' interest groups and intellectuals that champion intellectual freedom.

In the long run, the fate of the Christians depends on the fate of such groups. Subjectively, they may not be allies of the Christians, but objectively they are. Christians can help by making modest contributions to the success of these groups. One possibility is cooperation, not as an organised religious group, but as individuals, i.e., not as spokesmen for the Christians, but as concerned citizens; in short: as a form of political "dialogue of life".

## FIVE

### Looking for New Ways out of the Shadows: Preliminary thoughts for a discussion

Today, some of the old routes have been closed, but others have become more passable.

More than a quarter century has passed since the last settlements were founded. Nor would it make economic sense to found new ones, even if this were feasible. However, many Pakistani Christians still look with pride on the Christian villages. It would be worth the effort to study possible measures that could be introduced to strengthen the village economy.

One route where there is still a lot of room for improvement, quite literally, is the urban settlement project for low-income Christians. Here, too, unfounded fears of "ghettoisation" should be disregarded. For people who otherwise could not afford to live anywhere but in bastis for the foreseeable future, it makes a huge difference whether they live in a slum or in modest houses fit for human habitation. It also makes a huge difference to their standing in society as a whole.

However, the royal road out of inferiority is and remains education. To compete effectively with the rest of the population, members of minorities must have above-average qualifications. The first step in this direction is to ensure that every child gets a primary-school education. The master plan developed by the Catholic Church in Pakistan in the late 1980s with the support of Misereor helps to achieve this. A very welcome step in this regard would be an up-to-date evaluation that listed the successes and what still needs to be done.

Educational efforts at the primary-school level are only one prerequisite for collective social advancement. Another is vocational education, whereby the emphasis should be on those occupations in which caste prejudice does not play a role. Much has already been achieved in this field, but a lot remains to be done.

The proportion of Christians enrolled at Christian elite schools needs to increase further. Going to school together is the simplest and most effective form of a "dialogue of life" between Christians and Muslims, for whom precisely these schools pave the way to positions as the country's functional elite. Finally, the proportion of Christians at universities and colleges also needs to be expanded - not only in the "exportable" subjects such as medicine, engineering and informational sciences, but also in interpretive disciplines of the humanities and the social sciences. Given that higher education is very expensive, that Christian students find it increasingly hard to bear the costs, while the number of qualified students increases, scholarship programmes should be created or expanded.

Education is still the most feasible way of reducing the much-lamented "inferiority complex" of many Pakistani Christians. Of course, there is no guarantee that higher education will lead to social recognition - but without it, there is no chance at all. Because caste prejudice is so closely linked with traditional occupational profiles, it tends to decrease with modernization. As a rule, the educational sector is the first in which meritocracy prevails over group, class and caste privilege. People who succeed in this field have better chances of gaining acceptance in their working environment, especially in modern occupations that do not have a preordained place in the classic discriminatory structures of a caste system. Hence, it is encouraging that the proportion of Christians has risen not only in small-scale industries and the retail trade, but also in the technical trades and in commerce and business. Yet, it is still much easier for Muslims than for Christians to obtain credit from local and foreign sources. Therefore it would be sensible to examine whether there is a need to support savings associations, credit unions, banks that provide small and micro-loans and similar institutions that have proved very effective in many places, not least in Bangladesh. For reasons of size, it would not be sensible to consider specifically Christian institutions. It is quite enough for institutions to treat all applicants including Christians, as equals. This is another field that gives foreign aid the opportunity to demonstrate that Christians are an important, but not their exclusive focus.

It would be worthwhile to think about new ways of organising the Christian laity, especially those members who are socially and politically active. What is needed are not Christian interest groups - numbers alone condemn them to failure, but unobtrusive, discreet reflective groups that prepare their members to take part as individuals not in religious, but in civil society organisations with a specific focus or function.

Finally, there is the question of how the world church can and should help Pakistan's Christians. Decades of collaboration on single initiatives as well as on larger projects have proved generally beneficial. Does this type of help meet contemporary challenges in quantitative terms?

There should also be a discussion of whether the public relations work of foreign churches on the questions of human rights violations and discriminatory laws is helpful or harmful. When is the pressure of international publicity helpful and when harmful? The decisions should be left to those who have to live with the consequences.

The statement by the pope and those by other ecclesiastical institutions on the war in Iraq have done more than anything else to help Pakistani Christians in their present difficulties. The lesson to be learnt from this is that sustained and lasting efforts to get people to understand that Christianity and the new power politics of the West are not the same thing does pay off. Or to put it more succinctly: No matter how often Mr. Bush calls on God to bless America or on Americans for another crusade, he is not speaking in the name of Christianity.

Whatever the world church's contribution, one should be aware of what Pakistan's Christians have been able to achieve through their own struggle. The most encouraging event in recent years has been their opposition, joined by other minorities and by Muslim citizens as well, against including religious affiliation in

the National Identity Card in 1992. After three months of non-violent resistance they succeeded; as Father Bonny Mendes aptly put it: "It was their first taste of victory".<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Communication of March 5, 2005. The authors thank Father Mendes for his helpful corrections and addenda to the draft manuscript.

## EPILOGUE\* - March 2008

Over the last year, a chain of events has taken place which will have serious implications for the future of democracy in Pakistan, and therefore a profound effect on the minorities, particularly the Christians. From the sacking of the Supreme Court judges; to the establishment of an emergency rule; the assassination of ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto; through to the recent elections; etc, these events require at least a cursory examination.

In order to understand what happened in this period a quick summary of the political situation in Pakistan over the course of the last few years provides a helpful context. On June 20, 2001, just under two years after his coup October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf finally named himself the President of Pakistan, replacing the continuing figurehead, President Rafiq Tarar, who had been appointed by Nawaz Sharif. At the time there was wide anticipation that Gen. Musharraf would, in short order, step down as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), as he was under pressure from the West to enhance democracy in Pakistan and build relations in South Asia. To fulfill the latter expectation, in July Gen. Musharraf met with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in the first summit between India and Pakistan since before his coup, but no genuine peace-building initiatives emerged from this initiative. So Pakistan remained under the critical eye of the West, which regarded Pakistan as an unstable rogue state.

All this changed, however, following the events surrounding September 11, 2001. Gen. Musharraf immediately joined the US's "War on Terror" and politically, militarily and infra-structurally supported its invasion of Afghanistan. As an immediate quid pro quo, the US lifted most of the major sanctions which had been imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear test in May 11, 1998, but retained other sanctions which were put in place after Musharraf's coup in 1999. As part of an ongoing movement of this "War on Terror," as well as to further build a democratic façade for Pakistan, in January 2002, Gen. Musharraf banned two of the most militant violent jihadist groups, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, and openly talked about taking steps to curb religious extremism in Pakistan. At around the same time, he also announced that parliamentary elections would be held in October 2002, to end the three years of military rule. To ensure that he would continue to maintain his power in the political processes of Pakistan, regardless of the outcome of those elections, in April 2002 Gen. Musharraf held a referendum on his remaining in office as President. This referendum was universally acknowledged as being fraught with irregularities and totally unconstitutional, but it did give him another five years in office. In addition, just two months prior to the parliamentary election, Gen. Musharraf gave himself ex cathedra sweeping new powers, including the right to dismiss an elected parliament. The opposition forces rightly accused Musharraf of perpetuating dictatorship under the cover of elections.

In October 2002, the first general elections since 1999 took place. Despite much manipulation and maneuvering, Gen. Musharraf was unable to produce a result completely to his liking, and there was a hung parliament. The most ominous part of that result was the emergence of a new, radical Islamicist political coalition of

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\* Epilogue to the original study, by Charles Amjad-Ali

most of the religious parties in Pakistan, called the MMA, (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal). This coalition fared better than all these respective religious parties had in any previous elections ever held in Pakistan, even if one were to combine all their votes together. They had won 60 seats in the National Assembly which was 17.5% of the Assembly though they had only received 11.41% of the popular vote. The contrast becomes interesting when compared with the party which had received the highest number of popular vote, namely PPP, which had received 26.05% of the popular vote but got only 81 seats or 23.7% of the Assembly. They not only had a critical presence in the National Assembly, but had gained control of the Provincial Assemblies of NWFP and Baluchistan, where they formed the governments. Ironically both these provinces were critically decisive in the "War on Terror." The minorities saw this as a serious threat to their well being, as suddenly a whole series of new laws were enacted which had an Islamic thrust and thus threatened not only the progressive and secular forces but they also critically threatened religious minorities, particularly the Christians. By June 2003 the NWFP provincial parliament voted to introduce Shariah law in the province as a first step towards demanding it for the whole nation.

In order to keep the focus on the western frontier of Pakistan, Gen. Musharraf quickly began to work on the relationship with India. Pakistan, in November 2003, unilaterally declared a ceasefire in Kashmir, to a war that has never been declared. This was swiftly matched by India. Pakistan and India agreed to resume direct air-links between the two countries as well as to allow over-flights of each others' airlines starting in 2004, after a costly two year ban which meant flying around each others' territory.

In 2004, Gen. Musharraf got the parliament to approve the creation of a military-led National Security Council which had more power than the legislature. This was an effort to permanently institutionalize the role of the armed forces in civilian affairs as well as in the legislative process. Having not achieved the parliamentary result he wanted, in December 2005, i.e., three years after the election, Gen. Musharraf openly declared that he would stay on as the head of the army or COAS even though he was of retirement age by this time.

In the meanwhile, violence continued as the battle against terrorists in Afghanistan and the NWFP raged on, with jihadists killing civilians through suicide bombings. At the same time sectarian Sunni-Shia violence continued with ever increasing cycles of death, and a couple of attempts were made on the lives of both Gen. Musharraf and his Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. At regular intervals Pakistan would produce and kill "extremists," consequently getting huge outlays of money from the US, both as aid and as compensation for their role in the "War on Terror." The monetary influx, even by most conservative calculations, is estimated to be over 16 billion dollars.

On October 8, 2006, Pakistan suffered the worst natural catastrophe in its history, a massive earthquake in the north and north east which resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people. Huge international aid packages arrived in an area which was largely prone to jihadist movements. Unfortunately all this aid did not get translated into a change in the practices and politics of the people in these areas, as they continued to maintain their radical Islamist identity, and antipathetical position towards the US.

The Pakistan government continued to fight against terrorists throughout 2006. Under this cover, in August 2006 the security forces killed a prominent tribal leader in Baluchistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti. This in turn led to massive protests demanding the secession of Baluchistan from Pakistan. The security forces responded by becoming very repressive in that area, in effect repeating a long history of authoritarian repression against the people of Baluchistan.

In January 2007, a US intelligence report claimed that all of the leaders of al-Qaida were hiding out in Pakistan, an assertion which was then and continues to be strongly rejected by Pakistan.

Pakistan's significance to the West lies on three grounds: 1) its geography in that it lies on the border with many of the contemporary areas of tension, viz., Afghanistan, Iran etc.; 2) it is an influential country in terms of Islamic ideology which it has always conveyed beyond its borders; and 3) most critically, it is a nuclear power. If its governance or state fails, then the whereabouts and future of this nuclear arsenal is a very threatening proposition for the world both for its use by terrorists and proliferation to what the West sees as rogue states. So the maintenance of not only of a working Pakistan but a well governed Pakistan which has a healthy and prosperous society is critical for global nuclear arms control.

Throughout this period there was also a growing tension with India. Despite talks with India in July 2001, as an opening move towards regional peace, in May 2002, Pakistan pushed the envelope of its new alliance with the US, and tested three medium range surface to surface Ghauri missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, clearly also as a challenge to India. In August 2005, Musharraf took another unprovoked aggressive action by testing his first nuclear-capable cruise missile which was followed in December 2006, with yet another test of a short range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. This aggressive strategy may have worked for in February 2007, Pakistan and India finally signed an agreement aimed at ending the risks of accidental nuclear war.

On March 9, 2007, President Musharraf suspended the Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry, triggering a wave of anger across the country which also produced the first joint protests held by the parties of both the exiled former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. President Musharraf sacked the Supreme Court judges in order to avoid two things: *first*, the Supreme Court ruling on whether Gen. Musharraf could constitutionally continue to hold the office of President while at the same time remain the Chief of Army Staff; and *second*, the Supreme Court's demand to the state to produce before it several hundred of the estimated thousands of people who had disappeared over the last few years. Gen. Musharraf, hiding behind the US "War on Terror," said that all of these people were terrorists and had been handed over to the US. However it is widely believed by human rights group and the media both in Pakistan and outside that only a few hundred of these people had been sent to Guantanamo Bay, or had been sent through the "extraordinary rendition," for interrogation and torture. Extraordinary rendition is a highly dubious deportation process in contravention of normal extradition laws which often results in people being subjected to illegal interrogation processes. These processes have been challenged by many international laws including the Geneva Conventions. In fact, under the guise of the "War on Terror," Gen. Musharraf has also been getting rid of political enemies. Thus he sacked the

judges in order to avoid bringing both this issue and his complicity in the US operation in Afghanistan and in the border area into the open.

However, he totally underestimated the reaction of the people of Pakistan to this suspension of the judges. Activists, ordinary citizens, and lawyers took to the streets in the thousands in protest, and the country was paralyzed by the general strike. Studying this chain of events, it seems as if this was the straw that broke the camel's back and acted as a much larger catalyst than anyone had anticipated or predicted. This agitation continued to simmer all the way through late spring and early summer and a number of people were killed and injured at various points throughout this period. Because the newly energized independent media was reporting very critically on what President Musharraf was doing, in June he expanded media controls to include internet and mobile phones in order to impede the growing agitation and challenge to his rule. This brought some criticism from the west and all of a sudden Musharraf began to feel some heat in the form pro-democratic demands from some Western countries. As has been usual since 9/11 he used participation in the "War on Terror" and the fight against the jihadists once again as a justification.

In July, security forces stormed the Red Mosque complex in Islamabad, which was just a few blocks away from the Parliament building and the President's house. This mosque was a center of radical Islamism that was in open opposition to the government and which had been in a state of armed conflict with the police and army since the beginning of the year. While the state's aggressive action against this citadel of radical Islam softened western demands for democracy, agitation against Gen. Musharraf continued inside Pakistan. Thus, on July 20, he was forced to reinstate the Supreme Court including Chief Justice Chaudhry, hoping that both the issues which forced him to sack them would not be brought up again by the newly reinstated Supreme Court, especially Chief Justice Chaudhry, but within a week of his reinstatement both issues were back on the docket.

Around the same time Gen. Musharraf also began to negotiate with Benazir Bhutto on a formula for sharing power so that the democratic façade would have enough credibility to placate the West by having an acknowledged democratic secular Muslim as Prime Minister with him still as president, and both committed to an anti-jihadist and anti-terrorist position. A quick series of events followed. Gen. Musharraf met with Bhutto in Abu Dhabi, to negotiate possible power-sharing deal. In August the reinstated and reinvigorated Supreme Court ruled that the 1999 exile of Nawaz Sharif was illegal and that he could return to Pakistan. In September, Mr. Sharif returned to Pakistan but the state, contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling, sent him back into exile within hours of landing. In October prior to the elections that was scheduled for December, Gen. Musharraf organized the old parliament to elect him again into office of the president for the next five years. This was not only totally irrational but totally illegal as well. After the vote the Supreme Court made a statement that no winner could be formally announced until the Supreme Court ruled on whether a general who was still the COAS was eligible to stand for election at all. In October, Benazir Bhutto finally returned from exile and hundreds of thousands came out into the streets of Karachi to welcome her home. This jubilant scene was however marred when over a hundred people died in a suicide bombing that targeted her during her home coming parade.



While still awaiting the Supreme Court ruling on whether he was eligible to run for re-election and days before the state was required to produce several hundred of the disappeared people in court, on November 3, General Musharraf declared what he called "emergency rule" although by all accounts this was seen as a "mini martial law." Chief Justice Chaudhry was dismissed along with 60 Supreme Court and High Court judges, Ms. Bhutto and hundred of others party workers, lawyers and human right activists were briefly placed under house arrest and a caretaker government was sworn in. The new Supreme Court, now staffed with compliant judges who had taken an oath to the emergency rule and to Gen. Musharraf, dismissed the challenges to his re-election and did not raise the issue of production of the disappeared.

Gen. Musharraf then had Pakistan's Chief Election Commissioner announce that the general elections would be held on January 8, 2008, a one month postponement. Nawaz Sharif returned from exile again in November and under a huge amount of pressure President Musharraf first changed the power to stay and lift the "emergency rule" to the office of the president from that of the COAS, and having achieved this resigned from his army post. He was then sworn in for a second five year term as the president, before the election which was due in January. On December 15, President Musharraf then lifted the "emergency rule."

Twelve days later, on December 27, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated at an election campaign rally in Rawalpindi. Under the tragic circumstances surrounding Ms. Bhutto's death, President Musharraf postponed the elections until February 18. There was clearly a pre-election rigging of the process but the elections themselves, while not totally fair, clean and transparent, were deemed to be acceptable.

These elections produced a very interesting result, with PPP being the largest single party and Nawaz Sharif's Muslim League (PML-N) the second largest party. The President's own party, the PML-Q, was humiliated, despite all the pre-electoral gerrymandering. One of the most positive things to emerge from this election was the complete and total removal of the MMA from the National Assembly and even from the NWFP Assembly. The most secular party in Pakistan, on the other hand, namely the Awami National Party (ANP), which has an ethnic rather than a religious identity, had a huge showing in the areas at which MMA had been incredibly successful in the 2003 elections. As things stand today that party will be part of a grand coalition national government with PPP and PML-N, and together the three will challenge President Musharraf's position as president, as well as to the various assaults he has made on the Constitution and the Supreme Court. All these parties are committed to retrieving that court which has shown a great deal of strength and courage in all its dealing including against religious extremism.

It is interesting to add here that contrary to President Bush's policy, the US State Department report for 2007, the official document sent to the Congress, President Pervez Musharraf was not only condemned for dismissing the judges but it also notes categorically that his reelection for a second five year term was deemed to be deeply flawed by „domestic and international observers.” The report also observes that during 2007 the human rights situation worsened in Pakistan, stemming primarily from President Musharraf's decision to impose a 42-day emergency rule, suspend the constitution and dismiss the supreme and high court judges. The report praises the judiciary highly for trying to check the executive

power and to reverse President Musharraf's decision of March 2007, to suspend the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. All aspects of civil society and the press, and all the bar associations of Pakistan are unequivocal in their support for the chief justice and thoroughly condemned Musharraf's decision to sack him, the same agitation was raised after his second sacking of the 60 judges and the „new Martial Law” he declared in November.

All this augers slightly better circumstances for the minorities, especially the Christian minorities in Pakistan. This was of course the second election to be held on a joint electoral premise, thus giving Christians a dual voice in that they got to participate both in the general elections, as franchised adults, and in helping select certain candidates in the parliament on the basis of the percentage votes garnered by respective parties in the national and provincial elections.

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